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On June 17, 1963, in School District v. Schempp, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down a highly controversial decision banning state-
sponsored prayer and Bible reading from the public schools.' These
long-standing and popular practices were, the Court declared, "reli-
gious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of
the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality,
neither aiding nor opposing religion."2 In the uproar engendered by
this decision, little attention was paid to the retention of the Pledge
of Allegiance in the daily program of American public schools. 3 Nev-
ertheless, by the time School District v. Schempp was decided, the Pledge
had acquired a religious element of its own: the words "under God,"
inserted by Congress in 1954.'
For decades after this phrase was added to the Pledge, it was
widely considered to be too generic to advance any religious view,
and the Court mentioned it in dicta as an example of a religious ref-
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erence that does not rise to the level of an Establishment Clause 5 vio-
lation.6 In earlier generations, similar claims of religious neutrality
and minimalism had been made on behalf of the King James Bible;7
and, just as that perspective has changed over time,8 questions have
begun to arise about whether an affirmation of monotheism is consis-
tent with governmental neutrality toward religion. This matter was
taken to court in 2000 by atheist attorney Michael Newdow, who al-
leged that the daily recitation of "under God" in the public schools
constitutes an impermissible advancement of religion. 9
This Article uses Newdow's lawsuit as a springboard for a historical
consideration of religious affirmations in American public schools,
analyzing the evolution of thought on this issue from the early nine-
teenth century to the present. Parts I and II summarize the relevant
arguments presented by both sides in Newdow v. Congress of the United
Statesl° (later Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow)" with respect
to two issues: whether the phrase "under God" conveys or promotes
religious belief; and, if it does, whether there is sufficient justification
to make its inclusion in the Pledge permissible. Parts III through VI
place these arguments in a historical context, using a series of case
studies to illustrate how the underlying concepts have changed-and
not changed-over time. Based on this analysis, Parts VII and VIII
contend that the phrase "under God" is no more nonreligious or
nonsectarian than were Bible readings and the Lord's Prayer. It ap-
pears to be so only because the existence of God is accepted by the
vast majority of Americans, just as Protestant texts that are clearly sec-
tarian by today's standards were considered normative in earlier gen-
erations, when most Americans viewed them not as statements of con-
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46 (1989) (Blackmun, J., writ-
ing on his own behalf in Part III.B of the majority opinion) (discussing the genericness of legis-
lative prayer); id. at 602-03 (majority opinion) (mentioning the Pledge as an example of a non-
endorsement of a particular religion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1983) (giving the
Pledge and the national motto, "In God We Trust," as positive examples of government use of
religious references).
7 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 12-66, 82-105 (discussing violent disagreements over the
use of the King James Bible in public schools in the nineteenth century and contrasting this
with "the widespread belief that state-sponsored school prayer had been trouble-free for some
170 years").
See generally DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 52-105 (discussing shifting tactics and perspec-
tives in the debate over the Bible in public schools).
9 Original Complaint at 4, Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22366 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2000), rev'd, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002),
amended by 328 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (2004).
10 Newdow v. Congress, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
II Newdow, 542 U.S. 1.
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tested theological tenets but as simple acknowledgements of reality. 2
Thus, as this Article will suggest, the debate over religious affirma-
tions in public schools is not so much a straight line progressing from
Point A to Point B as it is a moving stream that changes even as it re-
mains the same, and remains the same even as it changes.
I. OVERVIEW
Representing himself before the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael
Newdow opened his oral argument with the following statement:
Mr. ChiefJustice, and may it please the Court:
Every school morning in the Elk Grove Unified School District's pub-
lic schools, government agents, teachers, funded with tax dollars, have
their students stand up, including my daughter, face the flag of the
United States of America, place their hands over their hearts, and affirm
that ours is a nation under some particular religious entity, the apprecia-
tion of which is not accepted by numerous people, such as myself. We
cannot in good conscience accept the idea that there exists a deity.
I am an atheist. I don't believe in God. And every school morning
my child is asked to stand up, face that flag, put her hand over her heart,
and say that her father is wrong.13
Newdow's opening statement goes to the heart of his argument: in
the context of the Pledge, "under God" is nothing less than a declara-
tion of religious faith that the government professes (which is bad)
and urges schoolchildren to affirm (which is worse).
The Supreme Court declined to decide Newdow's challenge on its
merits, electing instead to reverse a lower court ruling in his favor on
the ground that, as his daughter's noncustodial parent, he lacked
standing to sue. 14 This action was hardly unique in the history of ju-
risprudence on religion in public schools. In 1952, the Court dis-
missed a challenge to a state Bible-reading statute because the plain-
tiff student had graduated, 15 thus postponing a substantive decision
on that question until School District v. Schempp eleven years later.
Similarly, the Court dismissed Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,
which dealt with secondary-school religious clubs, because the appeal
had been filed by an individual member of the school board and not
by the board itself. Four years later, the Court upheld the constitu-
1 See discussion infra Parts III-V; see also DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 12-51 (providing an
overview of the dispute regarding Protestantism in public schools and noting that some Ameri-
cans continue to regard Protestant teachings as normative).
13 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624).
14 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 5.
i5 Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952).
16 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17 475 U.S. 534, 548-49 (1986).
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tionality of student-initiated religious clubs in Board of Education v.
Mergens ex rel. Mergens.is
Like those earlier dismissals, the decision in Newdow represents
not a closed book but a bookmark, and the question is not whether the
Court will decide such a case but what it will decide. Some would
claim that the inevitability of further action with respect to govern-
mental promotion of monotheism is based on the novelty of recent
challenges to this long-accepted practice,' 9 but this is not the case.
The real power of this conflict lies in the fact that it is anything but
new; the premises underlying it have been part of the discourse on
public education since its inception.0
This Article begins with an analysis of Newdow that identifies four
questions to be subjected to historical comparison:
* In determining whether a government action impermissibly
advances religion, to what extent does it matter how many
Americans share the relevant religious belief or how many
generations of Americans have shared it?
* To what extent does it matter how generic the religious con-
tent of the challenged speech is or whether it takes the form
of prayer?
* Do policies permitting dissenters to opt out of government-
led religious expressions adequately safeguard their religious
and civil rights?
* May expressions of religious belief by the government be justi-
fied on the ground that the American concept of liberty is
based on God-given individual rights that must be acknowl-
edged as such in order to ensure against infringement?
Following the discussion of Newdow is a brief overview of disputes in-
volving religious expression in the public schools since the early nine-
teenth century. As this material demonstrates, the religious beliefs
18 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990).
19 See generally DELFATrORE, supra note 3 (refuting claims of the novelty of the issue with his-
torical examples of similar challenges).
20 For a discussion of the historical conflict over religion in public education, see ROBERT S.
ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1994);
RANDALL BEZANSON, HOW FREE CAN RELIGION BE? (forthcoming 2006); DELFATTORE, supra
note 3; LYNDA BECK FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY? A HISTORICAL, JUDICIAL, AND
POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER (1989); JAMES W. FRASER, BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA (1999);
KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2005); CARL F. KAESTLE, THE
EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: NEW YORK CITY, 1750-1850 (1973) [hereinafter
KAESTLE, EVOLUTION]; CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY 1780-1860 (Eric Foner ed., 1983) [hereinafter KAESTLE, PILLARS]; JOHN
HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC (1969);
WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA
(1994); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973; A HISTORY OF
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS BATTLEFIELD OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1974).
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advanced by the government have become significantly broader with
the passage of time, and public schools that once promoted Protes-
tantism as the American religious norm now limit themselves to a ge-
neric "under God." Nevertheless, the assertion that there is a mean-
ingful difference between endorsing Protestantism and endorsing
monotheism lies in subjective perception, not in any principled dis-
tinction between the two. In both instances, a religious view shared
by the vast majority of Americans is presented by the government as
fact and as an element of the national identity." And in both in-
stances, this presentation of religion is viewed by its adherents as
minimal and by its opponents as divisive. The reasons are clear: by
their nature, public-school religious practices are based on beliefs
that are held in common by the majority-hence the sense among
adherents that little if any real doctrinal content is involved.23  Never-
theless, the circle of beliefs about religion encompassed by the pub-
lic-school practices of any given period, no matter how broadly drawn
by the standards of the time, leaves some people outside its periph-
21 See discussion infra Parts III-VI. For a general discussion of various religious groups in
public schools, see ALLEY, supra note 20; BEZANSON, supra note 20; DONALD E. BOLES, THE
BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1961); DELFATTORE, supra note 3; WILLIAM KAILER
DUNN, WHAT HAPPENED TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN
THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 1776-1861 (1958); FENWICK, supra note 20; W.S. FLEMING,
GOD IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1942); FRASER, supra note 20; GREENAWALT, supra note 20; ALVIN
W. JOHNSON & FRANK H. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1948); KAESTLE, PILLARS, supra note 20; LAUBACH, supra note 20; NORD, supra note 20; and
RAVITCH, supra note 20. See also DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 286-88 (discussing attempts to
formulate broadly acceptable statements of law on religious expression in public schools).
22 See People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610 (Colo. 1927) (holding that reading the
Bible without comment was not sectarian), overruled by Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656
P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982) (en banc), modified on reh'gen banc, 724 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986); People ex
rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251 (Il1. 1910) (holding that reading the Bible constituted wor-
ship and was prohibited); Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250 (Mich. 1898) (holding that read-
ing Bible excerpts did not violate the state constitution); State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch.-
Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890) (holding that Bible reading was sectarian); DELFATrORE,
supra note 3, at 17-18, 33-35, 44-45, 46-49 (discussing nineteenth-century conflicts between
Protestants and Catholics in New York City, Philadelphia, Maine, and Boston); id. at 56-61 (dis-
cussing Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872)); id. at 69-71 (discussing the 1950s
dispute over the allegedly nonsectarian prayer endorsed by the New York Board of Regents); id.
at 84-85 (addressing the claim that the Bible is religiously inclusive even with respect to athe-
ists); id. at 86-88 (introducing the dispute over Bible reading in School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963)); id. at 106-26 (outlining a 1964 controversy over attempts to amend the Con-
stitution to permit majoritarian school prayer); id. at 201-05 (listing the primary points of con-
tention regarding student-led religious meetings as permitted by the Equal Access Act of 1984,
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000)); id. at 286-88 (summarizing attempts to formulate broadly ac-
ceptable statements of law on religious expression in public schools); id. at 289-92 (discussing
1990s proposals to amend the Constitution to restore government-led school prayer); id. at
299-314 (discussing attempts to post displays in schools hearing the Ten Commandments, "In
God We Trust," "God Bless America," and the like following the Columbine shootings and the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
23 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3 passim.
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ery."4 To those outsiders, the doctrinal significance of the majority's
religious view speaks loud and clear. Accordingly, the question is not
whether the government may promote universally accepted religious
beliefs, as there are none. Rather, the question is and always has
been whether the majority has the right to use the public schools to
promote its conviction that its religious beliefs, whatever those may
be at a given time, represent objective truth.
Although the Supreme Court did not decide this question in New-
dow, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
and Justice Clarence Thomas submitted concurring opinions defend-
ing the daily recitation of the Pledge in public schools. 26 Their opin-
ions echo the reasoning once used to justify the inclusion of Bible
verses and the Lord's Prayer in the official public-school program,
particularly with respect to the premise that the government need
not take seriously those beliefs that cling to the outer edges of reli-
gious diversity in America. In the nineteenth century, when differ-
ences among Protestant denominations loomed large in the public
consciousness, pan-Protestantism represented the full range of reli-
gious belief generally accepted as "American., 2  Today, a similar
claim is made for monotheism. This Article will argue that, as a mat-
ter of principle and logic, there is no more justification for one asser-
tion than for the other. Just as reading the King James Bible pro-
motes Protestant belief over any other, so reciting "under God"
prefers monotheistic faith to atheism, agnosticism, and the various
forms of polytheism and nontheism. All that differs is the level of
specificity; the underlying issue of government support for one belief
system over all others remains constant. °
The gradual expansion of the range of beliefs encompassed by re-
ligious affirmations in public schools has led to one significant differ-
ence between Newdow and earlier controversies that it otherwise re-
sembles.31 In the past, whenever the increasing religious diversity of
the population has generated significant dissatisfaction with existing
public-school practices, such conflicts have been resolved by reaching
out to include a wider set of religious beliefs-hence the evolution
from specific Protestant dogmas to pan-Protestantism to Judeo-
24 See supra note 21.
25 See discussion infra Parts III-VI (demonstrating that America does not have universally
held religious beliefs).
26 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring); id. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
27 See discussion infra Parts III-VI.
28 See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Parts III-VIII.
30 See discussion infra Part VIII.
21 See infra Parts V-VI for a discussion of previous cases.
[Vol. 8:4
g26WHATIS PAST IS PRELUDE
12
Christianity or generic monotheism. By satisfying enough people to
take the steam out of the protest movement, such accommodations
have made it possible to sidestep the underlying question of whether
the majority religion should be promoted in the schools at all. 3 But
in challenges to the government's endorsement of generic monothe-
ism, such as Newdow, that approach is no longer viable because such
expressions as "under God," "In God We Trust," and "God Bless
America" are as generic as religious statements can be. The option
of backing off to a broader definition of religion no longer exists;
there is nowhere left to go short of pure absurdity. The arguments
raised by Americans outside the monotheistic tradition and by mono-
theists who support their claim to equality cannot be resolved b7
broadening the definition of religion, as has been done in the past.
If the public schools promote belief in a single God, it will have to be
with full acknowledgement that the government is favoring one reli-
gious belief over all others just as it would be if the schools were con-
tinuing to endorse Protestantism.
36
II. NEwDow
The complaint Michael Newdow filed in federal district court
claimed that the 1954 federal legislation adding "under God" to the
Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional and that the current version
37of the Pledge does not belong in the official public-school program.
When the district court dismissed his complaint, Newdow took his
case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 3 which found
in his favor on both points. The court later amended its decision to
apply only to the recitation of the Pledge in public schools.40 The Su-
preme Court ruled that Newdow had no standing to sue, 4 but the
constitutionality of reciting the Pledge in public schools was ad-
dressed in the oral argument and in concurring opinions by Chief
32 See infra Parts III-VIII for further discussion. See generally DELFATTrORE, supra note 3 passim
(discussing the evolution of religious practices in public schools).
" See generally DELFATTORE, supra note 3 passim (providing an overview of the historical ten-
sion between promotion of majoritarian beliefs and adherence to neutrality).
See infra Part VIII for further discussion.
35 See infra Part VIII for further discussion.
36 See infta Part VIII for further discussion.
37 Original Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
38 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 446 (9th Cir.
2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
39 Id. at 612 (holding that both the 1954 Act adding "under God" to the Pledge of Alle-
giance and the Elk Grove School District's policy of having teachers lead students in the Pledge
with those words included violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution).
40 Newdow, 328 F.3d at 468 (denying rehearing en banc and amending the panel decision).
41 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 5.
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Justice Rehnquist and by Justices O'Connor and Thomas.4 2 As indi-
cated earlier in this Article, the arguments on both sides of the case
focused on two questions: whether the Pledge promotes religion;
and, if it does, whether such promotion violates the Establishment
Clause .
A. Position 1: "Under God" Is Not an Affirmation of Religious Belief
All three of the Justices who wrote concurring opinions denied
that "under God" embodies any doctrine or requires any act on the
part of the speaker that rises to the level of "religion" for Establish-
ment Clause purposes." To be sure, Justice Thomas acknowledged
that when public schools encourage children to recite the Pledge,
they thereby violate Supreme Court precedents by soliciting an affir-
mation of the speaker's belief in God 5 He went on to suggest, how-
ever, that those earlier cases were wrongly decided. Under a correct
interpretation of the Constitution, he asserted, the Pledge would be
acceptable for use in the schools because it is not religious in anyS • 46
sense that has Establishment Clause implications. This view was
shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
I do not believe that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge converts
its recital into a "religious exercise" of the sort described in Lee. Instead,
it is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States
flag and the Republic that it represents. The phrase "under God" is in
no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion, but a simple rec-
ognition of the fact [that,] "[f]rom the time of our earliest history our
peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept that
our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God." Reciting the
Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a reli-
42 See id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 45
(Thomas,J, concurring).
43 The following sources discuss the primary arguments on both sides: Amicus Curiae Brief
of Religious Scholars & Theologians in Support of Respondent, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-
1624) [hereinafter Brief of Religious Scholars]; Motion for Leave to File Brief & Brief of Rev.
Dr. Betty Jane Bailey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Michael A. Newdow, New-
dow, 542 U.S. I (No. 02-1624) [hereinafter Brief of Clergy); Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Alle-
giance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholar-
ships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
HARv. L. REV. 155 (2004); Emily D. Newhouse, I Pledge Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America: One Nation Under No God, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 383 (2004).
44 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[Olur national culture allows
public recognition of our Nation's religious history and character."); id. at 37 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[G]overnment can.., acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the
Constitution."); id. at 46 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Pledge policy is not implicated by
any sensible incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which would probably cover little more
than the Free Exercise Clause.").
45 Id. at 47.
46 Id. at 47-49.
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gious one; participants promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to
any particular God, faith, or church.
... The recital, in a patriotic ceremony pledging allegiance to the
flag and to the Nation, of the descriptive phrase "under God" cannot
possibly lead to the establishment of a religion, or anything like 
it. 47
The Chief Justice's characterization of "under God" as "descrip-
tive" implies that the Pledge presents the existence of a single God as
fact. Moreover, his references to "any religion," "any particular God,
faith, or church," and "a religion"48 suggest that even if the First
Amendment permits endorsement of religion in general over nonre-
ligion, it nonetheless prohibits preference for any specific denomina-
tional faith over any other. It follows from these two assertions that
affirming the existence of a single God does not prefer any religion
over any other, which can be true only if the concept of "religion" is
limited to monotheism.
The premise implied by the Chief Justice is stated openly by Jus-
tice O'Connor. "Even if taken literally," she wrote, "the phrase is
merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United States as a
Nation subject to divine authority. That cannot be seen as a serious
invocation of God or as an expression of individual submission to di-
vine authority."4 9 Justice O'Connor thus suggests, as does the Chief
Justice, that the government may present the existence of a single
God and his relationship to this nation as matters of objective reality
rather than as theological tenets accepted by most Americans but
challenged by some. Unlike Justice Rehnquist, however, Justice
O'Connor explicitly acknowledges that "under God" falls outside the
scope of some religions:
[The Pledge] does not refer to a nation "underJesus" or "under Vishnu,"
but instead acknowledges religion in a general way: a simple reference to
a generic "God." Of course, some religions-Buddhism, for instance-
are not based upon a belief in a separate Supreme Being. But one would
be hard pressed to imagine a brief solemnizing reference to religion that
would adequately encompass every religious belief expressed by any citi-
zen of this Nation. The phrase "under God," conceived and added at a
time when our national religious diversity was neither as robust nor as
well recognized as it is now, represents a tolerable attempt to acknowl-
edge religion and to invoke its solemnizing power without favoring any
50
individual religious sect or belief system.
47 Id. at 31-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992), from which the Chief Justice dissented, where the Court struck down a policy
that permitted school officials to invite clergy to lead prayers at graduation ceremonies).
48 Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 40 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
50 Id. at 42.
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Justice O'Connor thus postulates that the benefits the majority
derives from the government's acknowledgment of monotheism and
from its employment of the "solemnizing power" of religious lan-
guage justify their use even as she candidly recognizes that the reli-
gious beliefs of some citizens are incompatible with a profession of
faith in one God. Although she calls these minority belief systems
"religion," she relegates them to a category that falls outside Estab-
lishment Clause protection. Otherwise, it would be impossible to as-
sert that no religion is being disfavored by the government's use of a
phrase that posits the existence of a single God and thus denies the
existence of multiple Gods and the validity of nontheistic beliefs.
Like the O'Connor concurrence, a question posed by Justice
Stephen Breyer to Michael Newdow during the oral argument sug-
gests an underlying distinction between monotheism as "real" relig-
ion that must be defined on its own terms and other belief systems
that may reasonably be asked to adapt themselves, or at least to resign
themselves, to the majority's preferences." Justice Breyer's inquiry,
which grapples with the conflict between "under God" and atheism
rather than with its implications for competing religious belief sys-
tems, goes beyond Justice O'Connor's assertion that the government
may posit the existence of God even though some Americans dis-
agree. The possibility Justice Breyer's question raises is that even
atheists could bring themselves inside the circle of "under God" by
construing the word "God" to represent
a set of beliefs, sincere beliefs, which in any ordinary person's life fills the
same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist.
So [the Pledge is] reaching out to be inclusive, maybe to include
you,... because many people who are not religious nonetheless have a
set of beliefs which occupy the same place that religious beliefs occupy in
the mind... of a religious mind in men and women. So do you think
God is so generic in this context that it could be that inclusive?5
Newdow replied in the negative:
I don't think that I can include under God to mean no God, which is ex-
actly what I think. I deny the existence of God, and for someone to tell
me that under God should mean some broad thing that even encom-
passes my religious beliefs sounds a little, you know, it seems like the
Government is imposing what it wants me to think of in terms of religion,
which it may not do.
Later, he accused the government of trying to persuade him to adopt
its own view that the government's declaration of faith in a deity is a
relatively inconsequential matter, whereas to him it means that "the
51 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 34-36.
52 Id. at 34-35.
53 Id. at 36.
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Government comes in here and says, no, Newdow, your religious be-
lief system is wrong and the mother's is right and anyone else who be-
lieves in God is right.
54
The fundamentally different interpretations of the phrase "under
God" expressed by Justice Breyer and Newdow echo nineteenth-
century disputes between Protestants and Catholics discussed later in
this Article. In the present as in the past, adherents of any belief sys-
tem that is accepted by almost the entire population have a strong
tendency to perceive its most general premises as universally applica-
ble and doctrinally minimal. To outsiders who embrace an entirely
different set of assumptions, however, the majority belief stands out
clearly as a distinct formulation that is treated as normative only be-
cause most people believe in it, not because it has been shown to be
objectively true."
In order to appreciate the implications of Justice Breyer's inquiry
about defining "under God" to encompass nontheological beliefs, it
might be useful to pose a hypothesis that would reverse the roles of
believers and nonbelievers. Let us suppose, for instance, that the
government affirmed belief in a pantheistic oversoul defined by its
adherents as including the full range of all possible belief and disbe-
lief. Technically, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and other monotheistic
faiths could find a place within such a formulation, as could any
other theory about the "big questions" such as creation, morality, the
nature of human life, and the existence of an afterlife. In this hypo-
thetical example, all that Jews, Christians, or Muslims would have to
do in order to accommodate themselves to the government's pre-
ferred manner of expression would be to affirm their own faith in
terms of a philosophical framework in which something whose exis-
tence they deny is defined as the ultimate source of truth. This is, in
effect, what Justice Breyer proposed to Newdow: that he validate the
majority's concept of God to the extent of adopting their belief that it
embraces every possible approach to the "big questions," which
would relegate his denial of God's existence to irrelevancy, or per-
haps to paradox.
Like Justice Breyer's question and the hypothetical situation pro-
posed above, the concurrences by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor are based on the underlying assumption that the view not
espoused by the government need not be treated as a clearly defined
54 Id. at 41 (referring to his child's mother, who is a Christian).
55 See infra Parts III-IV.
56 See selections from DELFATTORE, supra note 3, cited supra note 22.
57 See selections from DELFATTORE, supra note 3, cited supra note 22; see also GREENAWALT,
supra note 20, at 64-68 (discussing the teaching of religious ideas in public schools as fact be-
cause of the majority's acceptance of them).
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belief system in its own right, but may be regarded at least in part as a
vacuum created by the absence of the government-endorsed belief.
5
Thus, belief systems that fall outside the majority faith may reasonably
be asked to adapt themselves to fit certain presuppositions because
they have no meaningful boundaries of their own that are worthy of
respect.59 Moreover, as a matter of history, Justice Breyer's suggestion
that "under God" might be expanded to embrace atheists squarely
contradicts the intent of the drafters of that phrase, who introduced
it into the Pledge in the midst of the Communist scare of the 1950s
precisely as a way of distinguishing the United States from the atheis-
tic Soviet Union. 0  The strongest supporters of "under God" would
no doubtjoin Newdow in his emphatic denial that it can be extended
to include atheists. It thus appears to follow that only people who are
not strongly committed to either proposition and who regard the
conflict about "under God" largely as a political problem that admits
of a political solution could define it broadly enough to include non-
believers as well as believers.
See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 17-18, 33-35, 44-45, 46-49 (discussing disputes over the
nineteenth-century assertion of Protestantism as the social and governmental norm in New York
City, Philadelphia, Maine, and Boston); id. at 69-77 (addressing the assertion of monotheism as
normative in the dispute leading to Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)); id. at 86-94 (discussing
the issue of Protestant primacy in School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)); id. at 98-101
(summarizing a Delaware lawsuit involving the standing of agnostics to sue in school-prayer
cases); id. at 103 (referencing the Founders' belief in the primacy of Christianity); id. at 112-14
(defining the concepts of "religious toleration" and "religious equality"); id. at 117-18 (address-
ing claims that school-sponsored Protestantism is universally beneficial); id. at 121 (discussing
challenges to the right of nonbelievers to direct the religious upbringing of their children); id.
at 122-25 (discussing disputes over the contention that opponents of state-sponsored school
prayer are not on God's side); id. at 140-43 (addressing the difficulty of composing a universally
acceptable definition of "nondenominational" and its role in public worship); id. at 229-54
(demonstrating that school-sponsored majoritarian prayers and doctrinal Bible classes were
viewed as normative decades after Schempp); id. at 258-65 (addressing the argument that the
majority may require the minority to be present for religious observances); id. at 270-72 (dem-
onstrating the model of toleration as applied to majoritarian prayers at school sporting events);
id. at 294-95 (discussing a proposed school-prayer amendment to the Constitution); id. at 299-
314 (discussing calls for prayer as "American" and normative following the Columbine school
shootings and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001); GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 64-
68 (discussing the teaching of religious ideas in public schools as fact because of the majority's
acceptance of them).
See sources cited supra note 58.
Representative Louis Rabaut made a direct connection between the Cold War and the
changed Pledge language:
By the addition of the phrase "under God" to the Pledge, the consciousness of the
American people will be more alerted to the true meaning of our country and its form of
government. In this full awareness we will, I believe, be strengthened for the conflict now
facing us and more determined to preserve our precious heritage.
H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 3 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341 (quoting 100
CONG. REC. 7757, 7761 (1954) (statement of Rep. Rabaut)) (emphasis added).
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B. Position 2: "Under God" Is an Affirmation of Religious Belief and
That's Okay
The discussion thus far has focused on arguments suggesting that
"under God" does not constitute an affirmation of religious belief by
the government. During the oral argument, Solicitor General Theo-
dore Olson readily acknowledged that it does but denied that such an
affirmation violates the Establishment Clause. On the contrary, he
asserted, the government's recognition of the existence and primacy
of God is essential to the maintenance of fundamental American
freedoms. 6' His argument was based on the fact that at the time the
United States became an independent nation, the prevailing systems
of government in other parts of the world were based on the belief
that the power of the ruler came from God.62 By contrast, the new
nation adopted an emerging political philosophy that posited natural
rights inherent in every individual.6 s Citing the reference in the Dec-
laration of Independence to men being "endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights,"6 4 Olson concluded that the govern-
ment can and should proclaim its continuing obligation to limit its
own power according to God's design:
The Establishment Clause does not prohibit civic and ceremonial ac-
knowledgments of the indisputable historical fact of the religious heri-
tage that caused the framers of our Constitution and the signers of the
Declaration of Independence to say that they had the right to revolt and
start a new country, because although the king was infallible, they believe
that God gave them the right to declare their independence when the
king has not been living up to the unalienable principles given to them
by God.65
The Solicitor General was not alone in seeing a connection be-
tween religious faith and the political philosophy on which this na-
tion was founded. Some legal scholars have defended the phrase
"under God" by asserting that the most effective guarantee against
excessive or unjust use of government power is recognition by the
government and by the people of the need to respect individual
rights that are inalienable because-and only because-they are God-
given. 66 Under this theory, the power of God acts as a brake on the
61 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 22-23.
62 See id. at 23 (discussing the Declaration of Independence's signers' belief that the King
was infallible).
63 See id. at 23 (explaining the right of "the framers of [the] Constitution and the signers of
the Declaration of Independence" to revolt and start a new country when the King was not liv-
ing up to their God-given power).
64 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
65 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 23.
66 See id. (noting that the framers' religious heritage caused their belief in the right to revolt);
Berg, supra note 43, at 44 ("The phrase can be said to express the idea that our Nation's gov-
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government, which must respect and acknowledge its limitations as
coming from a power higher than itself (hence "under God") . This
interpretation of "under God" dates back to congressional documents
associated with the 1954 legislation that added that phrase to the
Pledge, particularly this excerpt from the House of Representatives
committee report:
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our Ameri-
can Government and the American way of life are under attack by a sys-
tem whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own. Our American
Government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the dig-
nity of the human being. Underlying this concept is the belief that the
human person is important because he was created by God and endowed
by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may
68
usurp.
In a recent article, Thomas Berg cites this passage in support of
his contention "that our Nation's government is limited in status and
must recognize inalienable rights that have a transcendent status be-
cause they come from God. The Establishment Clause may permit
the state to recognize this religious rationale for a political assertion
about rights and limited government. 6 9 More broadly, he suggests,
"The First Amendment, properly interpreted, permits the govern-
ment to rely on religious rationales in adopting policies on matters of
justice and the common good.... [Neutrality] does not prohibit the
government from relying on religious arguments in determining how
to legislate on [nonreligious] matters ....
This view is supported by Emily D. Newhouse, who suggests that
the Pledge, far from asserting any religious belief, including mono-
theism, is instead "an acknowledgment of a more fundamental be-
lief-that because individuals are endowed with certain inalienable
rights by God, the authority of government with respect to such rights
must necessarily be limited." In her view, the government cannot
discriminate against citizens based on their religion (what she calls
the "operational level"), but there is nothing to prevent it from pre-
senting a religious justification for its political philosophy (what she
calls the 'justificatory level") . Like the authors of the Newdow con-
currences, Berg and Newhouse appear to assume the actual existence
ernment is limited in status and must recognize inalienable rights that have a transcendent
status because they come from God."); Newhouse, supra note 43, at 400 (arguing that the
Pled7ge expresses the belief that God-given rights act as a check on government).
r8 See sources cited supra note 66.
H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), cited in Berg, supra note 43, at 53.
Berg, supra note 43, at 44.
70 Id. at 64-65.
7' Newhouse, supra note 43, at 400.
72 Id. at 402.
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of a single God. Accordingly, the fact that some people do not share
this belief is addressed in terms of reasonable accommodation for the
dissenters, not as a situation in which polytheistic, nontheistic, or
atheistic beliefs may claim equality with monotheism with respect to
influence over government decisions and pronouncements.
C. Position 3: "Under God" Is an Affirmation of Religious Belief and That's
Not Okay
The validity of atheism, polytheism, and nontheism as belief sys-
tems that cannot be accommodated by "under God" was affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a passage that was explicitly
referenced and contradicted by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor.7 3  The disputed passage points out that the Pledge is
framed as a profession of loyalty to the nation as described therein.
As such, the court found, it impermissibly co-opts schoolchildren into
affirming that a single God does in fact exist, 4 thus favoring a particu-
lar belief over all others. "In the context of the Pledge," the Ninth
Circuit declared,
the statement that the United States is a nation "under God" is a profes-
sion of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. The recitation
that ours is a nation "under God" is not a mere acknowledgment that
many Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely descriptive of the
undeniable historical significance of religion in the founding of the Re-
public. Rather, the phrase "one nation under God" in the context of the
Pledge is normative. To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United
States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the
flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and-since 1954-
monotheism. A profession that we are a nation "under God" is identical,
for Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation
"under Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a nation "under Zeus," or a na-
tion "under no god," because none of these professions can be neutral
75with respect to religion.
The Ninth Circuit's understanding of "under God" was reinforced
by two amicus curiae briefs submitted by religious figures: one writ-
ten by Peter Irons on behalf of nineteen scholars of religion and the-
ology, 76 and the other by Douglas Laycock on behalf of thirty-two
members of the Protestant and Jewish clergy." Their support for
73 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring); id. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
SeeNewdowv. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The... practice of teacher-
led recitation of the Pledge aims to inculcate in students a respect for.., the religious values
[the Pledge] incorporates."), revd sub nom. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1.
75 Id. at 487.
76 Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43.
77 Brief of Clergy, supra note 43.
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Newdow's position demonstrates that the argument regarding "under
God" in the Pledge is not a battle between believers and nonbelievers,
nor between adherents of monotheistic faiths and those who profess
polytheistic and nontheistic beliefs. As Parts III through VI will show,
the strongest opponents of government-sponsored religious speech
have always included members of majority faiths-often clergy and
scholars. Unlike those who wield religion as a political or social tool
or seek to shape it into an element of group identity, they approach
the meaning of each word seriously and precisely. 8 To them, it bor-
ders on blasphemy to misappropriate the imagery, ideas, and emo-
tional power of religion to further the secular purposes of the gov-
ernment or of the majority.79
Among the questions addressed in these amicus briefs is whether
the recitation of "under God" is noncoercive because no student has
to say either those words or the Pledge itself.80 The most significant
Supreme Court precedent is Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court struck
down clergy-led graduation prayer on the ground that peer pressure
and the desire to participate in a meaningful event constitute coer-
cion even if a school does not force any student either to attend
graduation or to join in the prayer.8' (A dissenting opinion maintains
that only a direct threat of governmental force or penalties should be
considered sufficient to violate someone's religious freedom. 2 ) The
applicability of Lee to Newdow is complicated by the fact that, whereas
the disputed speech in Lee was undeniably a prayer, the Newdow con-
currences define "under God" as something other than a religious
statement. 3  This is significant because if "under God" is not suffi-
ciently religious to trigger the Establishment Clause, then even if
public-school Pledge policies were found to be coercive no one's reli-
78 See Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 15, 18-19 (arguing that "the invocation of
God's name, in any setting, is a religious exercise and act"); Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 7
("The operative words at issue in this case are: 'I pledge allegiance to... one Nation, under
God.' There is no statement about what many Americans now believe, or have believed
through time; there is no statement about what the Founders believed."). See generally
DELFArrORE, supra note 3 passim (illustrating that different groups of religious believers vary in
their approach to the issue of religion in public school throughout U.S. history).
79 See sources cited supra note 78.
8o See Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 27-28 (discussing the likelihood that chil-
dren who opt out of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance because they do not adhere to a mono-
theistic religious belief will be seen as outsiders by their peers); Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at
15-20 (arguing that teacher-led recitation of the Pledge, though voluntary, nevertheless uncon-
stitutionally burdens religious minorities with the responsibility of refusing to affirm the im-
plied majoritarian religious proposition).
81 505 U.S. 577, 597-98 (1992).
82 Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring) ("I do not believe that the phrase 'under God' in the Pledge converts its recital into a
'religious exercise' of the sort described in Lee.").
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gious rights would be implicated. As Justice O'Connor expressed it,
"[a] ny coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an act of
ceremonial deism [such as the Pledge] is inconsequential, as an Es-
tablishment Clause matter, because such acts are simply not religious
in character.
8 4
In contrast with Justice O'Connor's view, the brief of the nineteen
religious scholars asserts that "under God" does indeed affirm a spe-
cific religious belief and that including it in the official public-school
program constitutes impermissible coercion:
[T]he addition by Congress of the words "under God" in the Pledge was
not merely intended to "acknowledge" a dusty historical fact. Congress
intended to enlist schoolchildren in "acknowledging" that the United
States today is or should be a nation "under God," and to affirm their own
belief in God.
... From a theological perspective, recitation of the Pledge including
the words "under God" and, more specifically, the term "God" affirms a
belief in a particular religious doctrine, that of monotheism."5
The brief further argues that "It]he term 'God' in its singular, capi-
talized form[] is exclusively monotheistic in meaning. It excludes re-
ligions that are nontheistic or polytheistic in tradition and doctrine,
as well as the philosophical positions of agnosticism and atheism. '' 6
Based on their conviction that "under God" favors monotheism
over other religions, the religious scholars maintain that peer pres-
sure is indeed sufficient to coerce unwilling students into endorsing a
particular religious view:
Schoolchildren who do not adhere to the monotheism endorsed in
the Pledge are impermissibly forced to choose between affirming reli-
gious beliefs they do not hold and foregoing participation in an official
patriotic ritual. Those who adhere to their convictions by remaining si-
lent or leaving the classroom during recitation risk being seen as "outsid-
ers" by their peers and branded as unpatriotic.
The thirty-two members of the clergy who filed an amicus curiae
brief shared the religious scholars' belief that excusing individual
students from reciting either "under God" or the entire Pledge is not
an acceptable solution. Their argument is based on the premise that
opt-out policies do not adequately address the real problem: that
"under God" represents promotion by the government of a particular
84 Id. at 44 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
85 Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 15-16.
8 Id. at 17.
87 Id. at 28.
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S• 88religious view even if no one is compelled to participate. Their brief
maintains that
[t]he lack of any article or modifier necessarily affirms that there is one
and only one God, that there is no other possible meaning or referent in
the category mentioned. And if there is only one God, then worshipers
of other alleged gods are mistaken. They are worshiping false gods; the
89
God of the Pledge is the one true God.
While acknowledging that the identity of this one true God may be
interpreted differently by different people, the amici suggest that the
most plausible interpretation is one that takes into account the heav-
ily Christian population in this country from the time of its founda-
tion to the present. They note that,
[g]iven those [historical and demographic] facts, few students would un-
derstand the Pledge to mean that the United States is under the God of
the Muslims, or of the Sikhs, or of the Zoroastrians .... Many students
probably assume that at least this is also the God of the Jews, but this
equivalence works only from a Christian perspective. From a Jewish per-
spective, the Triune God of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is uite different
from the Old Testament's more unified conception of God.
Defenders of "under God" in Newdow denied that the phrase con-
veys any meaningful religious content, but far from being reassured
by this assertion, the amici were troubled by the secularization of re-
ligious language:
To take these claims [that the Pledge is not a religious expression] seri-
ously is to say that the children are not expected to believe what they are
asked to recite, and that the Pledge is not intended to mean what it
plainly says. According to the school district and the United States, the
students say the nation is "under God," but they do not actually mean that
the nation is "under God." The Pledge is not a profession of belief, but a
false or insincere recitation. It is an apparent statement of religious faith
redirected-misappropriated-to secular and political purposes.
To this statement of the spiritual implications of the government's
secularization of religious language and content, Douglas Laycock
adds an analysis of its legal dangers in a law review article based in
part on the clergy brief.92  Commenting upon Chief Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of "under God," he observes that, " [i]f the
Court simply decrees the religious to be secular, instead of conceding
that it is religious and then carefully defining a permitted subset of
religious references or observances, then any religious statement can
88 Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 4-5.
8 Id. at 4-5.
90 Id. at 5-6.
91 Id. at 6.
92 Laycock, supra note 43.
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be labeled secular in the same essentially arbitrary way."93 Similarly,
reflecting on Justice O'Connor's concurrence, he suggests that the
government should refrain from conflating religious affirmations
with secular purposes:
This rationale is unconvincing both to serious nonbelievers and to seri-
ous believers. Justice O'Connor cannot solve the problem for nonbe-
lievers, who will experience the government's "language of religious be-
lief" as a singularly inappropriate and exclusionary means of achieving
secular purposes. Nor can she solve the problem for thoughtful believ-
ers, who see their religious language and images explained away and ap-
propriated for purposes deemed secular. The attempt to secularize reli-
gious language is a collective choice, overriding individual choices on• 94
both sides.
III. "THE PAST IS NEVER DEAD. IT'S NOT EVEN PAST.",
95
Throughout the Newdow case, the notion that this country was
founded on generic monotheism of the kind reflected in "under
God" went almost unchallenged except for a few brief references to
early Protestant-Catholic battles. Even Solicitor General Olson, who
came close to the truth when he spoke of the Founders' belief in
God-given individual rights, sidestepped the question of the specific
religious tradition to which that political philosophy was widely at-
tributed.96 In reality, when American public education as we now
know it was beginning to take shape in the early nineteenth century,
the vast majority of Americans identified not generic monotheism but
doctrinal Protestantism as the source of belief in limited government
and individual rights.97 Among other things, advocates of this view
93 Id. at 240.
94 Id. at 235 (footnote omitted).
95 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR ANUN 92 (1951).
96 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Solicitor Gen. Olson)
(arguing that the phrase refers to the Framers' religious ideals but failing to specify which ide-
als).
97 See ALLEY, supra note 20, at 59-70 (noting that, upon the arrival of Catholic immigrants,
"Protestants were shaken by a challenge to their belief in a national messianism that saw Roman
Catholics as enemies of the faith"); RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-
1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 118-19 (Quadrangle Books 1964)
(1938) (describing the Protestant sentiment that Catholics aimed to take over the United States
and "establish Popery and despotism"); WM. OLAND BOURNE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
SOCIETY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK WITH PORTRAITS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE SOCIETY 301-02
(New York, Win. Wood & Co. 1870) (statement of Bishop Hughes) ("[Methodist 'priest'] John
Wesley held and wrote that no government ought to grant toleration to Catholics; be-
cause.., they held it lawful to murder heretics."); MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA
RIOTS OF 1844: A STUDY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 59-60 (1975) ("[M]ost often political nativists at-
tacked Catholic priests for their politics and not their theology."); FLEMING, supra note 21, at
36-43 (discussing how "wherever the school went, the Bible went, essential in public educa-
tion"); KAESTLE, PILLARS, supra note 20, at 76 (discussing the belief among school leaders that
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cited the congregational decision making that is characteristic of
Protestantism, as contrasted with the hierarchical authoritarianism of
the Catholic Church."' They also noted the Protestants' respect for
direct contact between the individual soul and God independent of
priestly intervention.99
As this Part will show, there was a great deal of fear that America's
democratic values would be compromised if Roman Catholicism were
allowed to flourish here as it had in the repressive divine-right mon-
archies of Europe.00 And, it need hardly be mentioned, little thought
was given to non-Christian religions other than with respect to con-
trolling them or converting their members.1 As a result, the reli-
gious values taught in the early public schools were unequivocally
those of Protestantism, and the justifications for this practice were the
same as the reasons offered in Newdow for government endorsement
of monotheism: that it reflects simple truth, that it encompasses the
beliefs of the vast majority of the population, and that it constitutes
the source and safeguard of individual liberty. 2 Accordingly, debates
the three ideals of "republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism... were intertwined and mu-
tually supporting"); RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 6-9 (discussing Puritan-influenced laws passed in
1642 and 1647 requiring all children to become literate); see also Debate on the Claim of the Catho-
lics to a Portion of the Common School Fund, FREEMAN'SJ. (Cooperstown, N.Y.), 1840, Magazine, at
8-57 [hereinafter Catholic Debate] (debating the Catholics' request for their own portion of the
Public School Fund in light of Protestantism being the norm in the public schools).
98 See BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 69-70 (noting a Congregationalist minister who equated
Catholicism with despotism); BOURNE, supra note 97, at 264-65, 272-73 (statements of Rev. Dr.
Bond and Rev. John Knox) (contrasting Protestant and Catholic values); DELFATTORE, supra
note 3, at 22 (citing Billington as an example of Protestant sentiment against the Catholic
Church's structure); DUNN, supra note 21, at 245-55 (noting that the Catholic Church had to
maintain both "the faith in her people" and a stand "against bigotry until the older American
group got over their resentment and fears"); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 78 ("[T]he Native
American riots arose out of the incompatibilities between the Irish Catholic and native Protes-
tants sytems of moral behavior and religious training... .").
See BOURNE, supra note 97, at 350-496 (recounting the debate between Catholics and
Protestants over both political and religious theoretical differences).
100 See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
101 See DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 15, 29-31 (discussing the fear of giving equal weight to
minority religions with regard to school instruction and funding); see also REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, TO WHICH WAS REFERRED A COMMUNICATION
FROM THE TRUSTEES OF THE FOURTH WARD, IN RELATION TO THE SECTARIAN CHARACTER OF
CERTAIN BOOKS IN USE IN THE SCHOOLS OF THAT WARD 5-11 (New York, Levi D. Slamm 1843)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE] (deemphasizing the complaints of non-
Christians concerning the choice of books used in some schools).
102 Compare BOURNE, supra note 97, at 328 (statement of Bishop Hughes) (demonstrating that
Protestant values dominated the early public school system), DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 43-
46, 54-55, 58-60, 70 (spelling out the historical justifications for teaching Protestant values in
schools), FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 23, 25, 49 (discussing the Catholic founding of parochial
schools in Philadelphia in response to "the Protestant nature of the public schools"), and
RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 6-9 (recounting the Protestant origins of New York schools), with Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The phrase
'under God' is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion, but a simple recogni-
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about public funding of religious teachings in the early public
schools focused not on whether there is a God-which was generally
taken for granted as a nondebatable element of reality-but on what
the schools should teach about such specific matters as predestina-
tion and the proper form of baptism. °3 Only later, as the population
grew more diverse, did the public schools begin the long journey to-
ward generic monotheism by backing away from the doctrines of spe-
cific denominations and limiting themselves to generic Protestant
teachings and practices as a way of providing widely acceptable reli-
gious education.
0 4
An example of this movement toward pan-Protestantism occurred
in the early 1820s when the publicly funded schools of New York City
experienced one of the first of the upheavals that have never ceased
to enliven them.10 5 At that time, it was common not only for public
schools to teach religion, but also for the city to allocate state and lo-
cal education funds to denominational church schools, almost all of
which were Protestant. °6 In this instance, the Bethel Baptist Church
fion of... the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in
God." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The Pledge ... acknowledges religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic
'God.'"), id. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Pledge policy does not expose anyone to the
legal coercion associated with an established religion."), and Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at
30-34, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624) (arguing that the reference to God in the Pledge is not
a profession of religious belief).
103 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 13-21 (discussing the historical hegemony of Protestant-
ism in public schools and American society).
104 See BOURNE, supra note 97, at 302 (statement of Bishop Hughes) (noting tolerance be-
tween and among Protestants but not of Catholics); DELFATTORE, supra note 3, 14-15 (discuss-
ing how the states responded to tensions with "the establishment of schools deemed 'nonsectar-
ian' at the time, although by today's standards they would be better described as pan-
Protestant"); DUNN, supra note 21, at 281-303 (quoting a county commissioner who noted
"[t]he great want in our schools [is for] a real and thorough training in those duties which per-
tain to a Christian citizen"); FRASER, supra note 20, at 43-47 (observing that Protestants of all
types, but not outside groups, shaped the nineteenth-century public school system); KAESTLE,
PILLARS, supra note 20, at 76 (discussing the use of Protestantism as one instructive value in the
public school system); VINCENT P. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION: BISHOP
HUGHES, GOVERNOR SEWARD, AND THE NEW YORK SCHOOL CONTROVERSY 3 (1968) (discussing
the belief that schools could instruct students in a nonsectarian "Christian morality" that was
impliedly Protestant in nature).
05 For a discussion of the controversy, see HENRY A. BRANN, MOST REVEREND JOHN HUGHES,
FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK 67-69 (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co. 1892); DELFATTORE, su-
pra note 3, at 35-43, 65-66; JOHN R.G. HASSARD, LIFE OF JOHN HUGHES, FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF
NEWYORK 224 (1969); KAESTLE, EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 145-48; LANNIE, supra note 104,
at 36-37; RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 3-67; RICHARD SHAW, DAGGER JOHN: THE UNQUIET LIFE
AND TIMES OF ARCHBISHOPJOHN HUGHES OF NEW YORK 140-41 (1977).
106 See DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 13-14 (discussing public funding of Protestant schools in
New York in the early nineteenth century); KAESTLE, EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 145-48 (ex-
plaining that "when the Free School Society became alarmed over the expansion of the Bethel
Baptist Church charity schools, they campaigned in Albany for the withdrawal of all funds for
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in New York had, or was accused of having, misappropriated public
funds intended to support its school. °7 Following a heated dispute,
the Common Council of New York declared that no more funds
would be granted to denominational schools except in a few special
cases.'08 Instead, the bulk of the school funds was allocated to the
Public School Society (originally the Free School Society), a private
organization whose schools were considered religiously neutral be-
cause their daily program included no denominational instruction
but only the Protestant version of the Lord's Prayer, readings from
the King James Bible, and Protestant hymns.'09 Not surprisingly, the
denial of funds to schools that provided doctrinally robust instruction
and the preference shown to practices that, by the standards of the
time, appeared to be watered-down and generic triggered angry pro-
tests that meaningful religion was being excluded from the schools."0
As the middle of the nineteenth century approached, a different
kind of complaint about the schools' promotion of pan-Protestantism
took center stage, particularly in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
and other cities along the east coast where Irish Catholic immigrants
were arriving in large numbers."' Coming from outside the circle of
Protestantism that represented the world view of most native-born
Americans of the time, these new residents brought a different per-
spective to bear on the question of nonsectarian worship."2  Protes-
tantism as a whole was as sectarian to them as, in Protestant eyes, any
religious charity schools"); RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing the origins of New York's
public schools in a Protestant organization).
107 See RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 20-21 (providing an account of the troubles encountered
by the Bethel Baptist Church when it opened a school for poor children of all faiths with public
funding).
105 See id. (noting that the dispute resulted in an exclusion of religious societies from public
funding).
109 See id. (explaining the design of the Public School Society); see also BOURNE, supra note 97,
at 473 (statement of Bishop Hughes) (criticizing the Public School Society).
110 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 14-15 (discussing the controversy over attempts "to mini-
mize divisiveness in education"); FRASER, supra note 20, at 56-57 (noting that the "final com-
promise" over religious teaching in public school "pleased no one"); KAESTLE, PILLARS, supra
note 20, at 145 ("An attack on Protestant influence in government and schooling was an attack
on a coherent ideological perspective in which republicanism and universal education were
nurtured by Protestant Christianity and all three were linked in a view of progress and moral-
ity.").
M See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 18-22, 41-43; FRASER, supra note 20, at 49-66; RAVITCH,
suPra note 20, at 27-32.
.2 See DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 18-22, 27-29, 41-43, 46-49 (discussing controversies and
skirmishes that resulted from Protestant responses to Catholic outsiders). For further discus-
sion regarding alternative perspectives on nonsectarian worship in the nineteenth century, see
BILLINGTON, supra note 97; BOURNE, supra note 97; BRANN, supra note 105; FELDBERG, supra
note 97; HASSARD, supra note 105;JOSEPH L.J. KIRLIN, CATHOLICITY IN PHILADELPHIA: FROM THE
EARLIEST MISSIONARIES DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME (1909); LA.NNIE, supra note 104; JOHN J.
O'SHEA, THE Two KENRICKS: MOST REV. FRANCIS PATRICK, ARCHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE, MOST
REV. PETER RICHARD, ARCHBISHOP OF ST. Louis (1904).
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individual denomination might be." 3 Their firm and sometimes an-
gry rejection of "nonsectarian" practices that the vast majority of the
population saw as unifying and wholesome bewildered and often of-
fended that majority. 114
The most heated conflicts centered on the King James Bible,
which Protestants regarded as the cornerstone of individual liberty
and as the embodiment of their rebellion against the Catholic
Church's claim to be both the sole interpreter of God's word and the
intermediary between God and humanity." 5 The original dedication,
still in use at that time, referred to the Pope as "that man of Sinne,
'
16
and the original preface denied the validity of the Catholic Church
and accused it of withholding the scriptures from all but those dedi-
cated Catholics who "are, if not frozen in the dregs, yet soured with
the leaven of their superstition. 017  Naturally, the Catholic immi-
grants objected to their children being given that Bible and told that
it is the word of God, while the Protestant majority resented this hos-
tility toward the book that they saw as encapsulating and inspiring
their whole way of life." 8
113 Seesources cited supra note 112.
114 Seesources cited supra note 112.
115 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 21-23, 43-46 (explaining that the King James Bible has
historically "functioned as the icon of Protestantism: the embodiment of the defiance that the
earl Protestants hurled into the teeth of the Catholic Church").
Dedication to the Most High and Mighty Prince James, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain,
France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., THE HOLY BIBLE (KingJames).
117 Preface to THE HOLY BIBLE (KingJames) (1611 Translation).
11 See BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 142-43 ("Propaganda writers tried to show that.., the
Bible was forbidden to Catholics by their clergy lest they discover in reading the true word of
God that their religion was false."); BOLES, supra note 21, at 32-33 ("Protestants did not see the
Bible as a sectarian book, and could not conceive of Bible reading in the public schools as sec-
tarian instruction."); BOURNE, supra note 97, at 466-67 (statement of Bishop Hughes) ("The
third and last complaint is, that our Catholic brethren cannot consent to have this Bible read in
the hearing of their children." (quoting Protestant Hiram Ketchum)); BRANN, supra note 105,
at 74-75 (discussing Protestant opposition to the Catholic objection to Bible reading in
schools); DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 43-46 (quoting a Catholic claim that Protestant school
officials had stated, "We are determined to protestantize the Catholic children; they shall read
the Protestant Bible or be dismissed from the schools, and should we find them loafing around
the wharves, we will clap them into jail" (internal quotations omitted)); DUNN, supra note 21, at
258-62 (asserting that "[r]eliance upon the Bible as the sole criterion of faith is one of the most
fundamental dogmas of Protestantism"); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 84-86 (noting the Protes-
tant reaction to "reviled foreigners" reading "their own Bibles"); HASSARD, supra note 105, at
176-78, 280-81 (discussing the tension between Protestants and Catholics over the Bible in
schools); KAESTLE, PILLARS, supra note 20, at 171 (discussing the severe treatment of children
who refused to read the Protestant Bible); KAESTLE, EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 151-52 (not-
ing that for Protestants "Bible reading per se played a large role in religious instruction");
KIRLIN, supra note 112, at 304-30 (discussing the controversy over differing versions of the Bible
in the public schools of Philadelphia); LANNIE, supra note 104, at 64 (discussing the Protestant
defense of the KingJames Version); O'SHEA, supra note 112, at 120-37 (discussing how the use
of the Protestant Bible in schools "was felt as a grievous injustice by the shepherds of the Catho-
lic fold"); RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 33-45 (discussing Catholic dissent to Protestant Bible read-
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The concerns engendered by the Catholic newcomers were ex-
pressed at length by Hiram Ketchum, a trustee of the Public School
Society, who in 1840 engaged in a public debate with Bishop John
Hughes of New York.'19 In reply to the Catholics' attack on the exclu-
sive use of the King James translation of the Bible in New York public
schools, he declared,
The institutions of liberty and the altars of piety have sprung up in the
path of that translated Bible; and wherever that translated Bible has
gone, popular institutions have risen. All those glorious principles,
which here in this country are so conspicuous, have come from that Bi-
ble; and wherever that translated Bible has been kept from the hands of
the laity, there has been darkness and despotism.120
Similarly, a memorandum from a Methodist group spoke of the dan-
ger of allowing immigrant children to retain "unqualified submission,
in all matters of conscience, to the Roman Catholic Church , and a
Presbyterian minister added that the Catholic Church "continues to
be almost uniformly the enemy of liberty.'
12
Although concerns such as these were widespread, they were not
universally shared, particularly in the parts of the city with the most
heterogeneous populations.1 1 Not long after Ketchum gave that
speech, the New York state legislature forced New York City to estab-
lish local school boards which, in some instances, disagreed with the
prevailing opinion about religion in the public schools. 2 4 This ten-
sion crystallized when a local board in a culturally diverse, poverty-
stricken part of lower Manhattan made the then-outrageous sugges-
tion that Christianity as a whole is a sectarian faith. 25 The board pro-
ing); SHAW, supra note 105, at 160-61 (discussing the Protestant view that the KingJames Bible
promoted the American, Christian way of life). See generally FRASER, supra note 20, at 23-66 (dis-
cussing the evolution of Protestant and Catholic schools in the nineteenth century).
19 See Speech of Hiram Ketchum, reprinted in BOURNE, supra note 97, at 239-49.
20 Id. at 246.
1 Letter from N. Bangs et al. to the Honorable the Common Council of the City of New
York, reprinted in BOURNE, supra note 97, at 198, 200.
122 Catholic Debate, supra note 97, at 39.
123 See DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 52-66 (explaining how "the resistance of school officials
began to weaken as the non-Protestant population grew larger, more powerful, and better inte-
grated into the American mainstream"); RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 241-42 (discussing the ef-
fects of cultural and racial segregation); KAESTLE, EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 186-87 (discuss-
in2 the effects of merging cultures in the wake of immigration).
SeeAct of Apr. 11, 1842, ch. 150, 1842 N.Y. Laws. 184 (creating a school board for the City
of New York and mandating that public funding should not be provided to schools teaching
religious tenets and doctrines). For further exploration of the creation of school boards amidst
religious controversy, see BOURNE, supra note 97, at 576-99; BRANN, supra note 105, at 76-79;
DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 29-31; HASSARD, supra note 105, at 230-41; KAESTLE, EVOLUTION,
supra note 20, at 159-84; LANNIE, supra note 104, at 59-63; RAVITCH, supra note 20, at 75;
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 101.
2 See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 101, at 11 (discussing the view that
Christianity may be sectarian).
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posed to remove the King James Bible and other Christian works
from the schools under its control, reasoning that the Jews' denial of
Christ's divinity and the Universalists' disbelief in heaven and hell
made traditional Christian texts less than neutral toward religion.
126
A select committee appointed by city officials soon quelled this insur-
rection, noting that the dissident board's position
would justify the Mahometans, the Chinese or Pagans, on their coming
among us, to object to our whole system of public instruction, because it
interfered with their monstrous, absurd and unintelligible dogmas and
superstitions.
Even the Jews... cannot have the same privileges as those who em-
brace the Christian religion.... [Christianity] is in various ways incorpo-
rated and interwoven with our political systems, and recognized as the
predominant religion of our State.127
As this clash between the local school board and the select com-
mittee illustrates, opposition to traditional practices roused the ire of
school officials and caused a backlash that led to increasingly strin-
gent policies requiring all students to do such things as read the King
James Bible and recite the Protestant Ten Commandments. 2 s Chil-
dren who refused to engage in the prescribed religious activities were
subject to discipline and, ultimately, expulsion. 12 9 In some communi-
ties, their parents could then be prosecuted for their children's tru-
ancy.13 0 A Catholic newspaper in Philadelphia carried the story of one
little girl who
126 See id. at 5-9 (discussing Jewish and other views outside of the generic Protestant teach-
ings in public schools).
27 Id. at 7.
128 The Protestant second commandment, a prohibition against the worship of graven im-
ages, is missing from the Catholic version of the Decalogue. As a result, the commandments
that follow are one number higher in the Catholic version than in the Protestant. For example,
"Thou shalt not kill" is the Protestant sixth commandment but the Catholic fifth command-
ment. The Catholic version has ten rather than nine commandments because it divides the
Protestant tenth commandment, an omnibus prohibition against coveting, into two
commandments. SeeJim Myers, Which Ten Commandments?, http://www.biblicalheritage.org/
Bible%20Studies/10%20Commandments.htm (last visited May 18, 2006).
129 See, e.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854) (dismissing an action brought by a father
on behalf of his daughter, who was expelled from school for refusing to read from the Protes-
tant version of the Bible). For more examples of persecution of those who refused to acquiesce
in the religious activities of the majority, see DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 65-66 (discussing
cases challenging mandatory reading of the Protestant Bible); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 130-
31 (discussing the persecution of the Irish in retaliation for their challenge of the Protestant
Bible); KIRLIN, supra note 112, at 311-30 (discussing the difference between the request of
Catholics for their children's exclusion from Protestant Bible-reading and the Protestant inter-
pretation thereof).
0 See THOMAS H. O'CONNOR, FITZPATRICK'S BOSTON 1846-1866: JOHN BERNARD
FITZPATRICK, THIRD BISHOP OF BOSTON 112-13 (1984) (discussing Catholic parents who reacted
to Protestant Bible reading in schools by removing their children and the subsequent criminali-
zaion of truancy); see also 2 ROBERT H. LORD ET AL., HISTORY OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON
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had to submit to corporal punishment, before her companions, with a
spiritual lecture from the Teacher .... The child returned to her par-
ents, exhibiting the marks of violence inflicted upon her.
It will not do to affirm, "that no one is compelled to read the Protes-
tant Bible." This is sheer cant. The children are called up in class to
read it, and disobedience is a punishable offence. The poor children
know it, and fear to refuse. Hence, they are compelled to violate their
conscience, lest they be subject to the punishment inflicted by the pious
Teacher, for refusing to read the blessed word of God.
13 1
In Boston, an eleven-year-old boy named Thomas Wall, who led a
revolt against the mandatory recitation of the Protestant version of
the Ten Commandments, was caned until he complied. 3 2 According
to the Boston Police Court decision in a lawsuit filed by his parents,
teacher McLaurin F. Cooke "struck, beat and wounded Thomas with
a stick for the space of thirty minutes, inflicting serious wounds," 3  al-
though the beating was not continuous.1 3 4 The court concluded that
the teacher had been justified because "[e]very blow given was for a
continued resistance and a new offence.... The punishment ceased
when the offence ceased."'
3 5
Far more deadly than classroom beatings was the violence that
exploded in the streets as Catholics clashed with anti-immigrant Prot-
estants, particularly members of the extremist Native American Party,
which later evolved into the Know-Nothings.3 6 The most severe
manifestation of this conflict began in Philadelphia in 1842, when the
city school board passed a resolution recuiring all children in public
schools to read the King James Bible. r  The Catholic bishop of
IN THE VARIOUS STAGES OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 1604 TO 1943, at 585 (1944) (describing the "un-
compromising position that was taken in the schools").
Religious Persecution in the Public Schools, CATH. HERALD (Phila.), May 12, 1842, reprinted in 9
THE CATHOLIC HERALD 147, 149 (1841 [sic]).
132 See REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF McLAURIN F. COOKE, SUB-MASTER OF THE ELIOT SCHOOL, OF
THE CITY OF BOSTON, FOR AN ASSAULT AND BATTERY UPON THOMAS J. WALL, A PUPIL OF THAT
SCHOOL, WITH THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL, AND THE OPINION OF THE COURT REPORTED IN
FULL 81 (Boston, A. M. Lawrence & Co. 1859).
13 Id.
134 See id. at 86.
135 Id.
136 See BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 380-406 (detailing the rise of the Know-Nothing party).
137 See FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 78-79 ("[Bly making the KingJames version optional as a
school text, the Protestant majority would have been admitting that it could no longer set itself
above the Irish Catholic minority whose culture it considered inferior."); KIRLIN, supra note
112, at 312 (discussing "the un-American conduct of teachers who had attacked the faith of
some of their pupils"); 2 ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, PHILADELPHIA: A HISTORY OF THE CITY
AND ITS PEOPLE; A RECORD OF 225 YEARS 292-93 (1912) ("It was held that the Bible might be
read without meeting objection from any side."); O'SHEA, supra note 112, at 120-37 (recount-
ing how Bishop Kenrick "temperately stat[ed] the grounds of the objection which the Catholics
of the city entertained to the existing regulations in the schools"); JOHN B. PERRY, A FULL AND
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Philadelphia, Francis Patrick Kenrick, asked that Catholic children be
excused, thus enraging members of the Native American Party, more
familiarly known as nativists. 13 Open warfare erupted in the summer
of 1844 when a scuffle between Irish Catholics and nativists resulted
in the death of a nativist and the subsequent burning of the Catholic
neighborhood.3 9 The no-holds-barred nature of this battle was ap-
parent in a contemporary account:
[E]ven women and boys joined in the affray, some of the women actually
throwing missiles....
Many of the women who were not engaged with weapons, incited the
men to vigorous action, pointing out where they could operate with more
effect, and cheering them on and rallying them to a renewal of the con-
flict whenever their spirits fell or they were compelled to retreat.
As in most other riots which we have noticed in our city and county,
small and half grown boys formed no inconsiderable portion of the com-
batants on both sides, and contended with the most sanguinary spirit."'
Before that summer was over, more than twenty people had been
killed in the rioting. 4 1 Countless others were wounded, and the de-
struction of property included two Catholic churches, a library, a
convent, and most of a Catholic neighborhood. 42 The city was placed
under martial law for months while barefooted marines patrolled the
streets with cutlasses. 143 Citizens' watch groups also joined the fray,
including a patrol organized by the Philadelphia Bar Association and
composed of approximately sixty lawyers, law students, and clerks. 44
As the Pennsylvania Law Journal later reported,
COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF THE LATE AWFUL RIOTS IN PHILADELPHIA 3 (Philadelphia, J.B. Perry
1844) (providing a detailed account of the Philadelphia riots); 1 J. THOMAS SCHARF &
THOMPSON WESTCOYF, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA 1609-1884, at 663-73 (Philadelphia, L.H.
Everts 1884) (giving a historical account of the conflict).
138 See FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 89-93 (discussing Bishop Kenrick's call for an opt-out pol-
icy in schools and the nativist reaction thereto).
539 Id. at 111.
140 PERRY, supra note 137, at 8-9.
141 See FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 107-08 (discussing casualties of the riots); KIRLIN, supra
note 112, at 325 ("[M]ore than forty dwelling-houses were destroyed with their contents, while
over two-hundred families were rendered homeless .... More than sixty persons were seriously
wounded, while forty lives were sacrificed.... ."); OBERHOLTZER, supra note 137, at 296 (discuss-
ing the toll at the end of the Southwark riots); O'SHEA, supra note 112, at 126 ("An attack was
made upon [Irish homes]; doors and windows were battered in[, [and thereafter] some of the
assailants were struck down, never to rise again."); PERRY, supra note 137, at 42 ("[W]hile deeply
sympathising with the families ... of the slain, [the GrandJury] consider that sufficient time has
elapsed for the abatement of such feelings, and that they are no excuses for destruction of
buildings erected for the worship of God."); SCHARF & WESTCOI7, supra note 137, at 672 n.1
(listing the names of those killed).
142 SCHARF & WESTCoTT, supra note 137, at 673-74.
143 Id.I" See Praiseworthy, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 1844, at 2.
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[i]t is a matter of some congratulation, that the Philadelphia bar, at the
time of the late emergency, was so fully buckled up to the occasion, as to
resolve to go through the duty that might be prescribed, without much
regard to those technicalities by which the profession so often suffers it-
self to be hampered in extreme cases. That gentlemen of all ages,-from
the jurist who has retired from the clash of courts to the quiet of cham-
bers, to the student who has yet to look before him at the epoch of the
first speech,-that all classes of a profession, to say the least, the most
sedentary, and the least acquainted with gymnastics, should have hurried
together at the first call, and for five long nights should have carried
muskets and undergone drill,-is a thing most creditable.... If no glory
was won,-for fortunately whatever personal disarrangements took place,
were occasioned rather from the awkwardness of allies than the malice of
foes,-at least good feeling was extended .... 145
An attempt to spread the conflagration to New York City was
quelled by nativist leaders after Bishop Hughes informed the mayor
that, if Catholic churches were burned, Protestant churches would
not be far behind.' 46  The ultimate resolution in Philadelphia was a
new school board policy stating that Catholic students should be nei-
ther forced to read the King James Bible nor permitted to use the of-
ficial Catholic translation known as the Douay Version.'47 The chief
reason given for banning the Douay Bible from the schools was that it
contained extensive notes telling Catholics what they were to believe
about ambiguous scriptural texts, and Protestants were troubled by
the Vatican's opposition to the interpretation of scripture by individ-
ual Catholics.' 4  In accord with Catholic Church policy, the bishops
in America made it plain that the Protestant practice of reading scrip-
ture without note or comment, so that each reader could interpret
the text for himself or herself, was absolutely unacceptable to them.
49
:45 The Lord George Gordon Riots, and the Law Concerning Them, 3 PA. L.J. 333, 334 n. 1 (1844).
46 See BRANN, supra note 105, at 95-96 ("Had [Bishop Hughes] lived in Philadelphia, he
would have resisted the mobs with an armed body.... ."); HASSARD, supra note 105, at 275-76
("'I]f a single Catholic church were burned in New York, the city would become a second Mos-
cow.'"); SHAW, supra note 105, at 196-97 ("'They should have defended their churches since the
authorities could not or would not do it for them,' [Bishop Hughes] insisted.").
147 See FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 162-77 (discussing the aftermath of the riots); KIRLIN, su-
pra note 112, at 328 (reprinting a letter from George W. Biddle discussing "resolutions which
proposed to disuse the Bible as a class book in the schools" in order to "provide against any
similar" skirmishes in the future); O'SHEA, supra note 112, at 135 (discussing the incorrect Prot-
estant interpretation that the cause of the riots was the Catholic desire to exclude the Bible al-
together).
See FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 92-94 (discussing the Protestant belief that Catholic chil-
dren needed direct exposure to the Bible so they could interpret it for themselves).
149 See id. For further exploration of the bishops' condemnation of Protestant practices, see
BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 146-49; BOLES, supra note 21, at 178-82; BOURNE, supra note 97,
at 202-24, 277-312 (statements of Bishop Hughes); BRANN, supra note 105, at 72-74;
DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 14-22, 43-46; DUNN, supra note 21, at 204-20; HASSARD, supra
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To Protestants who placed a high value on independent interpreta-
tion of scripture and saw it as a symbol of personal liberty in a
broader sense, the Vatican's insistence that only Catholic Church of-
ficials could correctly interpret the word of God reinforced its image
as a dictatorship bent on undermining the respect for individual
rights and dignit that Americans claimed as the basis for their system
of government.
Adding to the Protestants' concerns was the long history of Protes-
tant-Catholic conflicts in the European nations from which most
Americans or their forebears had come, particularly instances in
which Catholic monarchs had persecuted Protestants and severely
curtailed their ability to practice their religion (as Protestant rulers
had in turn done to Catholics).15 The Catholic Church's control of
scriptural interpretation, its authoritarian power structure, and its as-
sociation with European monarchies all helped to convince the Prot-
estant majority in America that Catholic immigrants who remained
unconverted to Protestant values represented a real and present dan-
ger to the continuation of democratic principles and a republican
form of government in what was still a very young country.J In the
words of historian Ray Allen Billington, the Catholic immigrants to
America were considered "a Rome-directed group of papal serfs, bent
on the planned destruction of the United States. '53 Viewed from this
perspective, the inculcation of Protestantism through the public
schools was nothing more or less than an act of self-defense.
5 4
The reactions of nineteenth-century Protestants to what they be-
lieved to be the danger posed by the Vatican foreshadowed similar
responses to other perils later in this nation's history. 55 In the 1950s,
for instance, when the perceived threat to American values was no
longer the Vatican but Soviet Communism, essentially the same ar-
note 105, at 226; LORD ET AL., supra note 130, at 240-55; O'CONNOR, supra note 130, at 113-14;
SHAW, supra note 105, at 147.
150 See BOURNE, supra note 97, at 307 (recounting a disagreement over official or lay interpre-
tation of the Bible); DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 20-21 (discussing the Protestant argument
against limiting Bible interpretation to clergy); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 92-93 (observing
that most Protestants felt their Bible contained "basic teachings of American morality").
15, See BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 118-35 (discussing the American Protestant belief in a
Catholic plot to spread Catholicism to America from Europe and take over the country);
BOURNE, supra note 97, at 277-80 (statement of Bishop Hughes) (rebutting the assertion that
Protestants were treated poorly in Catholic-controlled regions of Europe).
152 See sources cited supra note 151. For further discussion of the Protestant majority's dis-
trust of Catholic immigrants, see DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 13-21; FELDBERG, supra note 97,
at 24-26.
153 BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 127.
154 See BILLINGTON, supra note 97, at 142-58 (discussing the causes of the movement to pro-
mote Protestantism in children).
,55 See DELFAT-rORE, supra note 3, at 52-53 (discussing the expanding circle of inclusion that
nevertheless preserved the problem between insiders and outsiders).
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guments were made with respect to belief in God that had once been
made about adherence to Protestantism.' Whereas earlier genera-
tions had associated divine-right monarchies with Catholicism,
Americans of the 1950s attributed Soviet collectivism and totalitarian-
ism to atheism. 57 As the House committee report and the House and
Senate conference report indicated, the purpose of the 1954 legisla-
tion adding the words "under God" to the Pledge was to affirm that
God is the source of individual rights and the inspiration for the po-
litical philosophy that protects those rights." According to those
documents, the recitation of the Pledge by schoolchildren was explic-
itly intended to defend against Communism by promoting the belief
that American freedoms flow from God.' 59 Moreover, just as nine-
teenth-century Catholics had been considered mindless thralls of the
Vatican, so 1950s Communists were accused of being brainwashed
into compliance with the Communist party line. 160 In both instances,
156 See H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 3 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341 (not-
ing that President Eisenhower had recently argued that "all the history of America bears witness
to the truth that in time of test or trial we instinctively turn to God" (internal quotations omit-
ted)); see also DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 68 (explaining that many Americans viewed the So-
viet Union as not a political threat but a religious threat).
157 See H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 2 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340 (argu-
ing that the Pledge's reference to God "would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic con-
cepts of communism"); see also 108 CONG. REC. 9, 11675, 11719, 11732, 11734 (1962) (debating
the "tenet[s] of American law and ... pinciple[s] of the spirituality of man" violated by the
Su reme Court decision outlawing state-sponsored prayer).
See H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2339-40
(noting how a belief in God underpins the American notion of individuality).
159 Id.
160 For reflections on the extent to which Communists in America were believed to be the
mindless pawns of a conspiracy to destroy democracy, see ERIC BENTLEY, THIRTY YEARS OF
TREASON: EXCERPTS FROM THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES, 1938-1968 (1971); WILLIAM J. BILLINGSLEY, COMMUNISTS ON CAMPUS: RACE,
POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY IN SIXTIES NORTH CAROLINA (1999); NOAM CHOMSKY ET
AL., THE COLD WAR & THE UNIVERSITY: TOWARD AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE POSTWAR
YEARS (Andr6 Schiffrin ed., 1997); COMMUNISM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE RECORD OF THE
TENURE CASES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, INCLUDING THE FINDINGS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON TENURE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS
(1949); DAVID P. GARDNER, THE CALIFORNIA OATH CONTROVERSY (1967); WALTER GOODMAN,
THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES (1968); ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE
SENATE (1970); DAVID R. HOLMES, STALKING THE ACADEMIC COMMUNIST: INTELLECTUAL
FREEDOM AND THE FIRING OF ALEX NOVIKOFF (1988); STANLEY 1. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN
INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982); LIONEL S. LEWIS, THE COLD WAR
AND ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE: THE LATTIMORE CASE ATJOHNS HOPKINS (1993); MCCARTHYISM:
THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE (Albert Fried ed., 1997); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES
(3d ed. 2003); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OFJOE MCCARTHY
(1983); MELVIN RADER, FALSE WITNESS (1969); MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND
MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER (1967); JANE SANDERS, COLD WAR ON THE CAMPUS:
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 1946-64 (1979); ELLEN SCHRECKER,
THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 2002); ELLEN W.
SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986); GEORGE R.
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adherence to a religious view antithetical to that of most Americans
was associated with blind loyalty to a totalitarian political system bent
on destroying the freedom and dignity of the individual.
Since September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to hear
the claim that only through a national commitment to God can
Americans hope to sustain our freedoms in the face of yet another
foreign, totalitarian belief system: radical Islam.' 61' There is, of
course, no doubt about the reality of the threat posed by violent reli-
gious extremists, but there is room for debate about the contention
that linking loyalty to America with the profession of some form of
majority religious belief is a necessary or appropriate step toward
keeping the nation safe. The identity of the real or perceived threat
to American political values has changed over time, just as the scope
of majority religious beliefs has broadened from sectarian Protestant
denominations to pan-Protestantism to Judeo-Christianity and mono-
theism. What remains constant is the conviction that the nation's
adherence the majority faith is essential to defining America's politi-
cal values and defending them against a totalitarian foreign system
that threatens liberty and individual rights.1
62
As this brief summary of nineteenth-century controversies sug-
gests, there are unmistakable parallels between them and the dispute
that gave rise to Newdow161 In each instance, the challenged public-
school practices reflect a religious view that most of the population
STEWART, THE YEAR OF THE OATH: THE FIGHT FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA (1950); ARTHUR V. WATKINS, ENOUGH ROPE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE CENSURE OF
SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY BY His COLLEAGUES-THE CONTROVERSIAL HEARINGS THAT SIGNALED
THE END OF A TURBULENT CAREER AND A FEARSOME ERA IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1969); SELMA
R. WILLIAMS, RED-LISTED: HAUNTED BY THE WASHINGTON WITCH HUNT (1993).
161 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. General Apologizes for Remarks About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003,
at A6 (discussing the apology of a top Pentagon official, Lt. General William Boykin, who com-
pared Islamic militants to "Satan," remarked that they did not worship a "real God," and ex-
plained that terrorists were attacking the United States because "we're a Christian nation");
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Gotta Have Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35 (quoting Congress-
man Tom DeLay's statement that "[o]nly Christianity offers a way to live in response to the re-
alities that we find in this world-only Christianity"); Susan Sachs, Baptist Pastor Attacks Islam,
Inciting Cries of Intolerance: Jewish and Muslim Groups Join in Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at
A1O (describing a speech by Reverend Jerry Vines in which he called the Prophet Muhammad a
pedophile and insisted that the Christian God would not "turn you into a terrorist").
162 See generally DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 112-13 (noting that the premise underlying re-
ligious toleration is that what "the majority believes, however it is defined, is inherently worthy
of greater deference than any other belief system").
16 Compare Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 6 (observing that the Pledge impli-
cates "the national values the flag symbolizes"), and Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 2-3 (dis-
cussing "[t]he conflation in the Pledge of religious and political affirmations"), with
DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 68-69 (discussing the Cold War origins of patriotic references to
religion), FRASER, supra note 20, at 49-59 (discussing disputes over school funding between
Protestants and Catholics), and NORD, supra note 20, at 75-76 (discussing the "almost sacred
status" of Americanism as a belief system).
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regards not as an article of faith but as a description of reality.64 In-
deed, to most adherents, the level of generality of religious affirma-
tions in public schools is, if anything, objectionably broad. 5  Cer-
tainly they cannot be seen as favoring one religion over another if the
definition of religion is limited to the tradition accepted by the major-
ity in a particular period: Protestantism in earlier generations, mono-
theism today. 66 Nonadherents to the majority tradition may not be
molested solely for professing their beliefs, but political activism
against popular public-school exercises is likely to generate deep re-
sentment. Perhaps most significantly, their belief systems are not
deemed religious in the sense that government endorsement of ten-
ets inconsistent with them would prefer one religion over another.
167
Linked with these assumptions is the conviction that the majority re-
ligious view is not only the wellspring of democratic principles and a
republican form of government but also the sole guarantee of their• 168
preservation.
HA See sources cited supra note 163; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing
the effects of the presentation of the majority religious view as fact).
Irz See discussion supra note 110.
166 Compare Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (opining that the reference to God in the Pledge "is a tolerable attempt to ac-
knowledge religion and to invoke its solemnizing power without favoring any individual reli-
gious sect or belief system"), and id. at 54 (Thomas,J., concurring) (concluding that the Pledge
does not constitute an establishment of religion), with People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P.
610, 616 (Colo. 1927) (discussing how sectarian referred to the various sects of Christianity, not
to Christianity or Protestantism as a whole, at the time the Constitution was ratified), overruled by
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982) (en banc), modified on reh'g en
banc, 724 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986), Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 380 (1854) (involving a
dispute over instruction of the Protestant King James Bible in school), Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ.,
77 N.W. 250, 253 (Mich. 1898) (holding that reading extracts from the Bible does not violate
the constitution of Michigan), Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that
daily recitation of the "Regents' Prayer" is not unconstitutional religious instruction), rev'd, 370
U.S. 421 (1962), Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (per curiam) (Bel-
dock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The recital of this prayer does nothing
more than acknowledge the existence of God and dependence upon him."), affd, 176 N.E.2d
579 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 17-18, 33-35, 44-
45, 46-49 (discussing nineteenth-century conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in New
York City, Philadelphia, Maine, and Boston).
167 See supra note 166.
168 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Solicitor Gen. Olson)
(discussing the Framers' belief in a sacred right to revolt); BOURNE, supra note 97, at 246 (state-
ment of Hiram Ketchum) ("The institutions of liberty and the altars of piety have sprung up in
the path of that translated Bible. .. ."); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 78-80 (discussing Protes-
tant resistance to acknowledgment of Bibles other than the King James Version); 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A PRELIMINARY
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1865-73 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (asserting that, the Es-
tablishment Clause notwithstanding, the government should promote "the great doctrines of
religion, the being, and attributes, and providence of one Almighty God; the responsibility to
him for all our actions, founded upon moral freedom and accountability; [and] the cultivations
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A further example of the similarity between past and present is
the fact that, throughout two centuries of debate, there have always
been members of the majority faith who disagree with the use of gov-
ernment power to promote their religious view. Just as the nineteen
religious scholars and the thirty-two members of the clergy who filed
amicus curiae briefs in Newdow risked the wrath of some coreligionists
by opposing "under God" in the Pledge,69 so some nineteenth-
century Protestant leaders stood out against the equally popular use
of the King James Bible in the public schools of their time. Promi-
nent among them was a Presbyterian preacher and scholar, Samuel
Thayer Spear, who criticized "Protestants [who] substantially ask for
themselves in respect to the public schools what they deny to Catholics"'"0 by
imposing Protestant practices on publicly funded schools:
King James's version is all very well for them, since they are agreed in ac-
cepting it; but it is not so for these other parties, who are taxed in com-
mon with them for the support of public schools, and who under our
theory of government have just as many and just as sacred rights as they
have in these schools. The very terms of their doctrine commit them to a
species of self-preference in the schools of the State, which they claim for
themselves, but will not concede to anybody else.' 7'
Despite the numerous similarities between the early Protestant-
Catholic battles and Newdow, there is at least one significant differ-
ence: the redefinition of coercion. In today's schools, it is taken for
granted that students have the right to opt out of saying "under God"
or the Pledge itself; the question is whether the risk of a negative re-
sponse by their peers constitutes a sufficient disincentive to make the
recitation less than truly voluntary. 172 Clearly, this concept of coer-
of all the personal, social, and benevolent virtues"); Berg, supra note 43, at 69-70 ("A state that
declines to acknowledge a deity is different from one that affirmatively requires worshiping the
emperor. But if 'under God' were removed from the Pledge,... a substantial number of reli-
gious Americans... will view the state as asserting that it is the highest authority."); Newhouse,
supra note 43, at 387-88 ("[Olur American form of government was founded on the belief that
individuals are endowed by God with certain inalienable rights, which necessarily limit the au-
thority of government.").
169 See Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 14; Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 4.
170 SAMUEL T. SPEAR, RELIGION AND THE STATE, OR, THE BIBLE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 41-
42 (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co. 1876).
17 Id. at 42.
172 See Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 27-30 (arguing that the Pledge forces
children to confront a "Hobson's choice of affirming the religious beliefs they do not hold or
forgoing participation in a patriotic exercise"); Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 15-17 (arguing
that "[t]he government has no legitimate role in shaping the religious opinions of the Ameri-
can people-not by coercion, and not by persuasion or endorsement either"); Petitioners' Brief
on the Merits, supra note 102, at 23-24 ("[A]n objecting student's First Amendment rights are
not violated when he or she is exposed to willing students reciting the Pledge."); Respondent's
Brief on the Merits at 15-16, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-
1624) (asserting that "[c]oercion stems not only from the didactic nature of the teacher-student
relationship.., but from the aversion youngsters have to being saddled with... 'outsider'
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cion does not even approach the standards of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when refusal to participate in prescribed religious practices re-
sulted in school-imposed penalties such as beatings and expulsions.'
73
At that time, newly arrived Catholic immigrants asked nothing more
than to have their children excused from reading the King James Bi-
ble, and they usually asked in vain.174 Ironically, by the time later
generations of Catholics and their Protestant supporters had ac-
quired enough power and influence to induce school officials to ex-
cuse dissenting students from prayer, this no longer seemed suffi-
cient. 75 Opt-out policies that would have delighted Catholics of the
pre-Civil War period were, by the late nineteenth century, scorned as
second-class treatment.
7 6
The question of whether opt-out policies are sufficient to guaran-
tee the rights of dissenters reflects a conflict between two models of
religious liberty: toleration and equality. Under the model of tolera-
tion, the government may endorse a religious view as long as dissent-
ers are not prevented from worshiping as they see fit.'77 More liberal
interpretations of this approach extend to atheism, whereas others
envision only a choice among religions. 7  Either way, the underlying
idea is that minorities have the right to exercise individual freedom
of conscience but not to stop the government from promoting the
majority religious belief. 1 As its name suggests, the competing
model-that of equality-requires the government to treat all views
status"); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding that a
school district's policy permitting noncompulsory student-led prayer at football games violated
the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (comparing public pres-
sure and peer pressure to overt compulsion).
173 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
115 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 57-59 (discussing how the justification "that no parent
could reasonably complain if other people's children read the Bible ... enjoyed wide accep-
tance, but not everyone agreed with it, and disputes involving opt-out policies began to make
their way into the courts").
176 Id.
177 Id. at 112-14.
178 Id.
179 Id.; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644-45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking
tradition to support the view that the Establishment Clause does not forbid prayer at official
ceremonies); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (No. 90-1014), 1991
WL 636285 (statement of Mr. Cooper) (arguing that a state could adopt a "state religion" if ac-
tual coercion did not accompany the act); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Weis-
man, 505 U.S. 577 (No. 90-1014) (urging the Court to agree that inclusion of invocations and
benedictions in graduation ceremonies does not involve coercion); Reply Brief for the Petition-
ers at 1-2, Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (No. 90-1014), 1991 WAIL 527616 (arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause must permit some civic expression of religion); BEZANSON, supra note 20 (manu-
script at 87-123, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law)
(arguing that a proper understanding of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
would allow for state-sponsored school prayers to promote religion in general so long as they
did not promote one religion over others).
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about religion the same.8 ° Under this model, people are entitled not
only to the free exercise of religion as individuals but also to a gov-
ernment that neither normalizes nor marginalizes, neither privileges
nor disfavors, any religious view.'8 ' Here, too, there is some inconsis-
tency about whether to embrace all religious beliefs or all beliefs
about religion, including atheism.8 2 Predictably, those who adopt the
toleration model see opt-out provisions as sufficient protection for
dissenters,13 whereas advocates of equality maintain that dissenters
180 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 584-86 (announcing that "even [a prayer] excluding any mention
of the Deity [cannot] be offered at a public school graduation ceremony"); id. at 604 (Black-
munJ., concurring) ("Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious
indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion."); id. at 610 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he [Establishment] Clause [is] applicable no less to government acts favoring
religion generally than to acts favoring one religion over others."); Everson v. Rd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (discussing the origins of the belief that government should not establish a
state church); People ex rel. Ring v. Rd. of Educ. of Dist. 24, 92 N.E. 251, 255 (Ill. 1910) ("The
only means of preventing sectarian instruction in the school is to exclude altogether religious
instruction, by means of the reading of the Bible or otherwise."); State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of
Sch.-Dist No. 8, 44 N.W. 967, 973 (Wis. 1890) (reasoning that the Bible is inherently sectarian
because it "contains numerous doctrinal passages, upon some of which the peculiar creed of
almost every religious sect is based, and ... such passages may reasonably be understood to in-
culcate the doctrines predicated upon them"); ALLEY, supra note 20, at 49-56 (discussing the
views of the Framers as they adopted the religion clauses of the First Amendment); ROBERT S.
ALLEY, WITHOUT A PRAYER: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 43-58 (1996) (noting a
recurring pattern "in which minorities have been castigated for refusal to accommodate or ex-
ercise tolerance for the dominant cultural patterns in a given community"); DONALD BOLES,
THE TWO SWORDS: COMMENTARIES AND CASES IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 74-76 (1967) (dis-
cussing the debate over the tolerance and equality interpretations of the Establishment Clause);
DELFAYroRE, supra note 3, at 52-55 (discussing the emerging belief that tolerance of Catholi-
cism was not enough where the state espoused Protestantism); GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at
17-22 (giving a brief historical account of the way the Supreme Court came to adopt the equal-
ity model); Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of History: The Supreme Court, Lessons
of History, and Church-State Debate in America, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND
LAWAT THE CROSSROADS 23, 24-27 (Jo Rene Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997) (discuss-
ing the basic agreement in the Everson opinions that there should be a separation between
church and state).
181 See supra note 180; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (5-4 decision)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying that the Constitution prohibits both government "entan-
glement with religious institutions" and "government endorsement or disapproval of religion");
Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 12-13 (arguing that the Pledge's "under God"
phrase violates neutrality principles); Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 4-5 ("The lack of any
article or modifier [between 'under' and 'God' in the Pledge] necessarily affirms that there is
one and only one God...."). Compare Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 102, at 24-25
(distinguishing constitutionally prohibited intrusion on religion by the state from constitution-
ally benign relationships between the two), with Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note
172, at 8 (arguing that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality with respect to
rel igon).
See supra note 181.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a student is not co-
erced into action, and that even action does not necessarily signify participation in a religious
exercise); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610, 614 (Colo. 1927) (concluding that chil-
dren cannot be required to attend Bible readings), overruled by Conrad v. City & County of Den-
ver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982) (en banc), modifled on reh'ken banc, 724 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986);
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are harmed when the government puts a thumb on the scale in favor
of the majority religious belief even if no unwilling person is forced
to take part in any ceremony or exercise.184 Indeed, the very act of
absenting oneself from a government-sponsored activity because of
the religious views it expresses is seen as a mark of subordination and
exclusion on the basis of religious faith.
18 5
MV. "THE PAST IS ONLY So HEROIC AS WE SEE IT"'
86
During the school-prayer conflicts of the early to mid nineteenth
century, the toleration model was rarely challenged. What most non-
Protestants sought was excusal from Bible reading, not the exclusion
of the Bible from the public schools."" By the early twentieth cen-
Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250, 251 (Mich. 1898) (finding no violation of the freedom of
religion where the student could be excused from Bible reading); Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 179, at 5-7 (arguing that the prayer is voluntary); Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 179, at 8-9 (arguing that "traditional public acknowledgements of religion"
are not coercive); Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 179, at 7-9 (arguing that the stan-
dard should be actual coercion).
184 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587-88 (noting the "subtle coercive pressures" in "a secondary
school environment"); id. at 605-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Tihe rights of conscience
are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand." (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Car-
roll))); id. at 613-14 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the legislative history of the Establish-
ment Clause); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a mes-
sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."); Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 27-30 (noting the coercive pres-
sures on children to recite the Pledge); Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 15-17 (arguing that
the Pledge should be treated as "government-sponsored religious speech"); Petitioners' Brief
on the Merits, supra note 102, at 30-34 (arguing that the Pledge is not a religious act and that
therefore there is no coercion); Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 172, at 12-15 (ar-
guing that "both endorsement (of Monotheism) and disapproval (of Atheism) were intended
by the Act of 1954"); ALLEY, supra note 20, at 212-13 (noting the argument that coercion de-
pends on the context and fact pattern); ALLEY, supra note 180, at 130-34 (discussing the at-
tempt to overrule the Lemon test by introducing the element of coercion); DELFATTORE, supra
note 3, at 259-66 (discussing briefs laying out arguments on both sides in the Weisman school
prayer case); GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 47 (noting that a critical element is school "spon-
sorship" of prayer).
185 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 588, 592-93 (explaining why "prayer exercises in public schools
carry a particular risk of indirect coercion"); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 228 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The prayers announced are not compulsory, though some may
think they have that indirect effect because the nonconformist student may be induced to par-
ticipate for fear of being called an 'oddball.'"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of
direct governmental compulsion .... ."); DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 274-75 (noting that the
court found the "coercion" in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe significant).
186 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU 310-11 (1906).
17 See BOURNE, supra note 97, at 466-67 (statement of Bishop Hughes) (suggesting alterna-
tive versions of the Bible); BRANN, supra note 105, at 72-74 (arguing that Catholics object to
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tury, however, some degree of religious diversity had become a fact of
life in many parts of the country, and a series of lawsuits raised ques-
tions about the right of public schools to promote Protestantism even
where dissenters were excused. 188 Like the early Protestant-Catholic
conflicts discussed in Part III, these post-Civil War lawsuits over opt-
out policies reflected long-standing assumptions and dynamics that
have surfaced most recently in Newdow.
In Newdow and in the earlier conflicts discussed above, arguments
about opt-out policies were inextricably linked with the problem of
defining sectarianism, since the justification for Bible reading and
prayer in the public schools was that these practices represented ge-
neric religion as opposed to promoting any particular sect.89 The
more traditional view held a practice to be sectarian if it represented
the teaching of a single denomination or if it took sides on a matter
of contention among religions.' 90 (In context, the term religion meant
Protestantism, since pan-Protestant practices were deemed nonsectar-
ian even when they clearly conflicted with Catholicism or with non-
their own children being made to listen to Protestant Bible reading in schools); DELFATrORE,
supra note 3, at 52-66 (discussing early attempts by Catholics to establish a ight to opt out of
school prayer and Bible reading); FELDBERG, supra note 97, at 78-79 (discussing the Catholic
desire for an opt-out policy); FRASER, supra note 20, at 33-34 (discussing the Protestant desire to
indirectly influence Catholics to convert); HASSARD, supra note 105, at 230-32 ("We feel it is
unjust that such passages should be taught at all in schools .... But that such books should be
put into the hands of our own children... was in our opinion unjust, unnatural, and at all
events to us intolerable."); KAESTLE, EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 145-51 (discussing the
Catholic view that "[m ] oral education apart from sectarian religion was a Protestant delusion");
KAESTLE, PILLARS, supra note 20, at 101-02 (discussing the belief that the Catholic desire to be
excused from Bible reading was an attack on Protestant ideology); RAVITCH, supra note 20, at
46-57 (discussing Bishop Hughes's attempt to change the mandatory Bible-reading policy in
New York schools); SHAW, supra note 105, at 147 ("[T]he inculcation of Protestantism in young
children would lead, so [Catholics] felt, to infidelity. A true neutrality in religious teachings
being impossible, the Catholics ... wanted monies to run schools that were as Catholic as the
common schools were Protestant.").
188 See Vollmar, 255 P. 610; People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist. 24, 92 N.E. 251 (Ill.
1910); Pfeiffer, 77 N.W. 250; Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872); State ex rel. Weiss v.
Dist. Bd. of Sch.-Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890); see also BOLES, supra note 21, at 100-36
(discussing the evolution of the law regarding Bible reading in schools); DELFATTORE, supra
note 3, at 52-61 (discussing the shift of legal focus from opt-out policies to outright prohibition
of public school religious teaching); JOHNSON & YOST, supra note 21, at 41-73 (tracking the
courts' shift toward exclusion of Bible reading from public schools).
189 See sources cited supra note 188.
190 See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 380 (1854) (discussing the use of the generic "Prot-
estant version" of the Bible among "divers [sic] religious sects"); Murray v. Curlett, 179 A.2d
698, 699 n.1 (Md. 1962), rev'd sub nom. Schernpp, 374 U.S. 203 (dismissing the contention that
the practice was sectarian because the petitioners' brief failed to distinguish between sectarian
and nonsectarian religious teachings); Pfeiffer, 77 N.W. at 252-53 (allowing the reading of the
Bible in public schools for purposes other than religious instruction); Engel v. Vitale, 176
N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (distinguishing between adoption of a
particular sect and a generic acknowledgement of God); DELFATTORE, supra note 3 passim (dis-
cussing shifting definitions of sectarian).
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Christian faiths.) Competing with this viewpoint was an emerging
understanding of religion in which nonsectarian referred to tenets or
exercises that are common to all religious belief systems and contra-
dict none-leading to the conclusion that, for practical purposes,
there is no such thing as nonsectarianism.1 91
Among the best-known of the early state court decisions dealing
with the sectarianism problem was Board of Education v. Minor, in
which thirty-seven Protestants unsuccessfully challenged the city
school board's removal of Bible reading and prayer from the public-
school program. The primary reason for the board's decision was
that any devotional exercise, no matter how generic it might be
within a given religious tradition, would nonetheless exclude some-
one's beliefs.1 9 3  The Ohio Supreme Court, having decided the case
on the basis of the board's right to determine the school program,
added:
To teach the doctrines of infidelity, and thereby teach that Christianity is
false, is one thing; and to give no instructions on the subject is quite an-
other thing. The only fair and impartial method, where serious objection
is made, is to let each sect give its own instructions, elsewhere than in the
state schools, where of necessity all are to meet; and to put disputed doc-
trines of religion among other subjects of instruction, for there are many
others, which can more conveniently, satisfactorily, and safely be taught
elsewhere. 1
94
Similarly, a ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court ordered the ter-
mination of Bible reading, prayer, and hymn singing in the public
schools on the ground that all religions are entitled to equal treat-
ment under the law:
195
The majority of [Illinois citizens] adhere to one or another of the Protes-
tant denominations. But the law knows no distinction between the Chris-
tian and the Pagan, the Protestant and the Catholic. All are citizens.
Their civil rights are precisely equal. The law cannot see religious differ-
191 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213-15 (reasoning that government ought to be neutral with re-
spect to religion, which meant staying away from the matter altogether); Enge, 370 U.S. at 433-
36 (reasoning that "[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate gov-
ernment in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
prayers"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("No person should be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.. . ."); Ring, 92 N.E. at 255 (con-
cluding that the Bible is inherently sectarian); Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 242-43 (reasoning that the
state constitution required the teaching of morals in schools, not particular religious views);
Weiss, 44 N.W. at 972-73 (noting the presence of faiths, such as Judaism, that reject fundamen-
tal assertions of the Christian Bible, such as the divinity of Jesus); DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at
87-88, 93-94, 108, 141-42, 297, 309, 313 (discussing fundamental disagreements over the con-
tent of religious messages in schools).
192 Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211.
19 Id. at 211-12.
194 Id. at 253.
195 Ring, 92 N.E. at 257.
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ences, because the [state] Constitution" has definitely and completely
excluded religion from the law's contemplation in considering men's
rights. 
197
Consistent with this model of equality, the court found that opt-out
policies are inappropriate because they marginalize nonadherents
while allowing the schools to continue promoting the majority relig-
ion. "If the instruction or exercise is such that certain of the pupils
must be excused from it because it is hostile to their or their parents'
religious belief," the decision stated, "then such instruction or exer-
cise is sectarian and forbidden by the [state] Constitution.'
198
A similar case arose in Wisconsin when a local board of education,
having voted to continue using the King James Bible in its schools, of-
fered to excuse Catholic children. 99 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected the board's claim that Bible reading is nonsectarian and
found that the opt-out policy was not enough to make the practice
acceptable:
When, as in this case, a small minority of the pupils in the public school
is excluded, for any cause, from a stated school exercise, particularly
when such cause is apparent hostility to the Bible, which a majority of the
pupils have been taught to revere, from that moment the excluded pupil
loses caste with his fellows, and is liable to be regarded with aversion, and
subjected to reproach and insult. But it is a sufficient refutation of the
argument [that the opt-out policy is appropriate] that the [opt-out pol-
icy] tends to destroy the equality of the pupils which the [state] constitu-
tion seeks to establish and protect, and puts a portion of them to serious
disadvantage in many ways with respect to the others.00
At the opposite extreme is a decision by a court that was so con-
vinced of the efficacy of opt-out policies that it ordered one over the
objections of both sides. In People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, a Colorado
school board required all children to participate in Protestant reli-
gious exercises, and a Catholic family sued not for an opt-out policy
but to have the devotionals terminated.2 1  In a ruling that resembled
Justice O'Connor's observation that "under God" favors no particular
religion even if it conflicts with religions like Buddhism, 2 the Su-
preme Court of Colorado declared that sectarianism must be assessed
196 A disproportionate number of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century lawsuits
that tested opt-out policies and the concept of nonsectarianism took place in midwestern and
western states whose state constitutions imposed stricter rules on government involvement with
religion than did the First Amendment as it was then interpreted.
197 Ring, 92 N.E. at 255.
198 Id. at 256.
199 State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch.-Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967, 969 (Wis. 1890).
200 Id. at 975.
201 255 P. 610, 613 (Colo. 1927), overruled by Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662
(Colo. 1982) (en banc), modified on reh'gen banc, 724 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986).
202 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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only with respect to Christian (i.e., Protestant) faiths."' By that stan-
dard, the court found that pan-Protestant practices are nonsectarian
even though they are incompatible with the Catholic faith.0 4 Never-
theless, the court ruled that Catholics have a right to individual free-
dom of conscience and thus cannot be required to participate in a re-
ligious exercise even if it is nonsectarian.20 5 In another decision,
Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, Michigan's Supreme Court scolded a
Catholic parent who sought the termination of Protestant exercises
even though his own child was permitted to opt out.206 Having de-
clared the King James Bible nonsectarian, the court chided the plain-
tiff for religious intolerance.0 7
As the last two examples suggest, not all state courts of this period
were embracing a broader definition of sectarianism, and the same was
true of the movement toward or beyond opt-out policies. Neverthe-
less, although the line was far from straight, there was a discernable
trend toward declaring pan-Protestantism sectarian and either requir-
ing opt-out policies or ordering the public schools to terminate their
devotionals. When the matter finally reached the U.S. Supreme
Court in the early 1960s, its decisions in Engel v. Vitale and School
District v. Schempp 2° were highly significant because they asserted the
right of the federal courts to apply First Amendment standards to
public-school prayer. Those decisions did not, however, break new
conceptual ground. ° On the contrary, the conclusions the Court
reached about public-school promotion of religion had been on the
map for generations.'
V. "THE TEST OF COURAGE COMES WHEN WE ARE IN THE MINORITY;
THE TEST OF TOLERANCE COMES WHEN WE ARE IN THE MAJORITY.
212
Although decided a year earlier than Schempp, Engel was the more
modern of the two cases in that it concerned a broad conceptualiza-
tion of sectarianism and a highly generic form of worship. (The
morning exercises in Schempp, which consisted of Bible reading and
the Lord's Prayer, were similar to the nineteenth-century practices to
203 Vollmar, 255 P. at 616.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 618.
77 N.W. 250, 251 (Mich. 1898) ("Is it not intolerant for one not required to attend [read-
ings of the Bible] to object to such readings?").
207 Id.
208 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
209 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
210 See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
212 Ralph W. Sockman, Famous Quotation, available at http://en.thinkexist.com/quotation/
the-test_of_courage comeswhen weare_in_the/224637.html (last visited May 18, 2006).
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which Bishops Hughes and Kenrick had objected.2 ) The prayer at
issue in Engel was composed by the Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York, whose members "included representatives
of the Hebrew, Catholic and Protestant faiths, and at least one
prominent Unitarian. 21 4 It said, "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our par-
ents, our teachers and our Country.2 5 The Regents proposed the
prayer in response to
the dire need, in these days of concentrated attacks by an atheistic way of
life upon our world and in these times of rising juvenile delinquency, of
crime increasing both numerically and in gravity of offense, with an ever-
swelling number of criminals being counted in the younger age groups,
of finding ways to pass on America's Moral and Spiritual Heritage to our
216youth through the public school system.
The Regents thus defined generic monotheism, not the King
James Bible, as the source of morality, the foundation of democracy,
and the only true defense against the threat of domination by a totali-
tarian foreign power.217 They also maintained that their prayer did
not represent "[f] ormal religion," which they defined as "any and all
sectarianism or religious instruction which advocates, teaches or pre-
fers any religious creed."2's Like proponents of "under God" in the
Pledge, they did not regard monotheism as one religious creed
among many. Rather, they viewed it as normative and deemed the
opt-out provision to be sufficient protection for the rights of those
whose beliefs about religion were based on something other than a
single God.219 Their stand was conceptually similar to nineteenth-
century court decisions stating that pan-Protestant practices did not
prefer any religion over any other even if Catholics objected to220
them. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor made a simi-
213 Compare Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205-06 (discussing the Bible-reading practices), with discus-
sion supra Part III (discussing the nineteenth-century practices).
214 Brief of Intervenors-Respondents at 3, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (No. 468), re-
printed in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 847, 860 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
215 Enge4 370 U.S. at 422.
216 Motion for Leave to Submit a Brief Amicus Curiae at 14, Enge, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468),
reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 214, at 959, 974 [hereinafter Brief
of the Board of Regents].
217 See id. at 22-23 ("It is thus clear that the recognition of, and acknowledgment of, our de-
pendence on 'the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe' was [a] duty... in the transaction of im-
portant functions of the body politic.").
28 Transcript of Record at 32, Enge4 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468).
219 Brief of the Board of Regents, supra note 216, at 17-18, 22-23.
220 See supra Parts III-IV.
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lar point in their Newdow concurrences with respect to polytheistic
and nontheistic religions. 1
On the other side of the debate, opponents of the Regents' pro-
posal denied that the prayer was dogma-free. Rather, they asserted, it
promoted beliefs whose widespread acceptance blurred the fact that,
to nonadherents, they were indeed doctrinal. When a school district
in northern New York adopted the Regents' Prayer for daily use, a
group of dissenting parents sued. Their argument was based on the
premise that no prayer can be considered nonsectarian if it conflicts
with any belief about religion. "The Regents' Prayer is sectarian and
denominational," their brief stated,
since it includes a declaration of belief in the existence of God, which is a
belief not shared by several faiths in this country, including the Society
for Ethical Culture, to which one petitioner belongs.... Moreover, [the
trial court] found, as a fact, that the prayer is contrary to the religions of
petitioners who have a religion and to the beliefs of petitioner who pro-
222
fesses none.
The Engel plaintiffs lost in the lower courts, which agreed with the
school district that the prayer was nonsectarian and consistent with
America's theistic heritage. ,s In a statement that finds echoes in So-
licitor General Olson's oral argument in Newdow, 2 the New York
Court of Appeals associated monotheism with the American political
system:
Belief in a Supreme Being is as essential and permanent a feature of the
American governmental system as is freedom of worship, equality under
the law and due process of law. Like them it is an American absolute, an
application of the natural law beliefs on which the Republic was founded
and which in turn presuppose an Omnipotent Being.
2 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2004) (Rehnquist, Cj.,
concurring) (reconciling the provision in question with atheist beliefs); id. at 36 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a reasonable observer would not perceive the Pledge as endorsing
religion or nonreligion). But see id. at 48-49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that, although
the Pledge does coerce students into declaring a belief in God, earlier Establishment Clause
cases had been wrongly decided and should not apply to Newdow).
222 Brief for Petitioners at 7, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS
ANDARGUMENTS, supra note 214, at 761, 771.
223 See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (N.Y. 1961) ("[Blelief and trust in a Supreme
Being was from the beginning and has been continuously part of the very essence of the Ameri-
can plan of government and society."), rev'd, Engel, 370 U.S. 421; Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d
453, 494-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (finding that a prayer acknowledging "dependence" upon "Al-
mighty God" "cannot be considered sectarian in the sense that it prefers any particular sect"),
aff'd, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960), afj'd, Engel, 176 N.E.2d 579, rev'd, Engel, 370 U.S.
421.
224 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 19-23.
225 Engel, 176 N.E.2d at 582.
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Accordingly, the lower courts allowed the prayers to continue as long
as the school district adopted an explicit opt-out policy.
22
1
The opt-out policy was not well-received by the plaintiffs, whose
focus was not on having their own children excused but on inducing
the school district to adopt the model of equality rather than that of
toleration.2 7 In their view, as long as the schools promoted monothe-
ism, the government was not maintaining neutrality with respect to
religion:
The same officials who teach children, and demand that the latter learn,
that two plus two equals four and that "c-a-C spells "cat", now say that
there is a God, to Whom children should say a specified daily prayer, and
from Whom children may ask, and expect to receive, blessings for them-
selves as well as others. Under these circumstances, petitioners respect-
fully submit, the effect on the children involved will be much the same
whether they say the Regents' Prayer, or remain silent while it is said, or
even if they leave the classroom or the school building during its recita-
tion."'
The Supreme Court agreed:
There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program offi-
cially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer.
The respondents' argument to the contrary, which is largely based upon
the contention that the Regents' prayer is "non-denominational" and the
fact that the program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not
require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so
to remain silent or be excused from the room, ignores the essential na-
ture of the program's constitutional defects. Neither the fact that the
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance
on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limi-
tations of the Establishment Clause.... [which,] unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental com-
pulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an offi-
cial religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not.... When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain. 29
The Court's attention to "indirect coercive pressure" and its de-
scription of monotheism as an "officially approved religion" set the
bar for violations of religious neutrality much lower than many peo-
226 See id. at 581 ("The order here appealed from contains adequate provisions to insure that
no pupil need take part in or be present during the act of reverence, so any question of com-
pulsion or free exercise is out of the case." (internal quotations omitted)).
227 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 222, at 9 ("[T]he influence on the minds of pu-
pils.., cannot be avoided by permitting the pupils to leave their classroom ...
228 Id. at 32.
229 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
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pie had thought it to be. This was particularly bad news for the de-
fendant school districts in Schempp v. School Distric s° and Murray v.
Curlett,21 two school-prayer cases that were on their way to the Su-
preme Court. In accordance with the laws in their respective states,
the public schools in both cases were starting the day with a reading
from the Bible-usually from the King James Version-and the reci-
tation of the Lord's Prayer.232 A Unitarian family in Abington, Penn-
sylvania, and the atheist leader Madalyn Murray (later O'Hair) in Bal-
timore, Maryland, first tried to have their own children excused from
the exercises. When the schools refused, both families filed suit:
the Murrays in the Maryland state courts, and the Schempps in fed-
eral district court. The Murrays lost their case, and the Schempps
won theirs, in the lower courts. The two cases went to the Supreme
Court at about the same time, and the Court heard them together
and issued a single decision covering both.2 5
Although the doctrinal content of Bible reading and the Lord's
Prayer is significantly more substantial than that of the Regents'
Prayer, the decision in Engel made it advisable to minimize the reli-
gious element as much as possible.236  Accordingly, the Baltimore
school district's brief to the Court conceded the religious nature of
the Bible and the Lord's Prayer but contended that they
are not used in the challenged opening exercises as a form of religious
instruction or as a religious service. Rather, these materials are utilized
as a source of inspirational appeal to inculcate moral and ethical pre-
cepts of value in a salutary and sobering exercise with which to begin the
school day.2 7
At the suggestion of the Maryland attorney general, the Baltimore
schools also established an opt-out policy, arguing that any possible
violation of anyone's freedom of conscience had thereby been elimi-
nated.2 s Similarly, Abington school officials maintained that "[t]he
230 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
231 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962), rev'd sub nom. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
22 Schempp, 201 F. Supp. at 816; Murray, 179 A.2d at 699.
233 See Schempp v. Sch. Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (describing high school
student Ellory Schempp's attempts to be allowed not to participate in his school's habitual Bi-
ble-reading exercises), vacated, 364 U.S. 298 (1960) (per curiam); Murray, 179 A.2d at 699 (de-
scribing how the petitioner, a fourteen-year-old, had been "required and compelled" to attend a
school Bible-reading program).
24 Scheinpp, 201 F. Supp. at 820-21; Murray, 179 A.2d at 699.
235 Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
2% See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) ("We think that by using its public school sys-
tem to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a prac-
tice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.").
237 Brief of Respondents at 4, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (No. 119) (consolidated
with Sch. Dist. v. Schempp), 1963 WL 66464.
238 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Murray, 374 U.S. 203 (No. 119) (consolidated with
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp) (statement of the Court), reprinted in 57 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
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statutory Bible reading practice is not a religious practice. It requires
only that those who wish to do so may listen to daily readings without
discussion or comment from a great work that possesses many values,
including religious, moral, literary and historical." 9 Consistent with
this claim, they initially refused to excuse dissenters on the ground
that there was no need to do so if the exercise was not religious, but
2401
the state law was later amended to include an opt-out provision.
The skepticism with which the Court greeted attempts to dilute
the religious significance of the Bible was evident in an admonition
delivered by Justice Hugo Black during the oral argument:
It seems to me like .. .you'd do better if you'd face the issue. I don't
know what's the answer to it, but how can you assert seriously or argue or
ask us to consider seriously this is not a religious ceremony based on the
Bible and the Lord's Prayer? Those who are strongest for it I doubt,
would not hesitate to say that.!"
Douglas Laycock uses unusually direct language to make a similar
point with respect to "under God" in the Pledge. "Of course," he
wrote, "the government's secular interpretation of the Pledge was a
polite lie, told only to the Court. Perhaps the government hoped the
Court would repeat the lie, but surely it did not expect that the Court
would believe the lie."242
Predictably, having found the generic prayer in Engel to be reli-
gious, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion about Bible
reading and prayer in Murray and Schempp.
[I] n both cases the laws require religious exercises and such exercises are
being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the [Schempps and
Murrays]. Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that in-
dividual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for that
fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Es-
tablishment Clause.24 3
Moreover, the Court ruled that:
we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a
State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority
of those affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of re-
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 951, 994
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter 57 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS] ("[T]he rule was amended so as to release him from participation in these exer-
cises.").
239 Brief for Appellants at 12, Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (No. 142), reprinted in 57 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 238, at 695, 711.
240 See id.
241 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Murray, 374 U.S. 203 (No. 142) (consolidated with
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp) (statement of the Court), reprinted in 57 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 238, at 951, 978.
242 Laycock, supra note 43, at 225.
243 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224-25.
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ligion. While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state
action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant
that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its be-
liefs....
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved
through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the in-
violable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to rec-
ognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of gov-
ernment to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or
oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and relig-
244ion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
The Court's decision in Schempp drew heavily on its reasoning in
Engel a year earlier, although Engel involved a recently composed
monotheistic prayer and Schempp dealt with long-standing pan-
Protestant practices. The close relationship between Engel and
Schempp with respect to the time period in which they occurred, the
arguments presented on both sides, and the rationales on which they
were decided is yet another indication that the main point in such
cases is not the theological content of government-sponsored speech,
whether Bible reading or generic monotheistic prayer. The real issue
is the underlying tendency to identify a majority religious view, pre-
sent it as normative and quintessentially American, and attribute to it
a certain significance, symbolism, and power in relation to the
American system of government.
With respect to religious content, one obvious difference between
Engel and Schempp on the one hand and Newdow on the other is that
the two 1960s cases involved prayer, which is by its nature religious,
whereas Newdow's "under God" is not a prayer. As Solicitor General
Olson pointed out in his oral argument, the Court, in dicta, has re-
peatedly contrasted the Pledge with challenged practices that in-
volved prayer as such: "[T]his Court has also said the ceremonial
rendition of the Pledge of Allegiance in context repeatedly over the
years... would cause a reasonable observer to understand
that.., this is not a religious invocation. It is not like a prayer, it is
not a supplication, it's not an invocation. 2 45 Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed, stating that "'under God' is in no sense a prayer, nor an en-
dorsement of any religion., 246  Similarly, Justice O'Connor main-
tained that a reasonable observer "could not conclude that reciting
the Pledge, including the phrase 'under God,' constitutes an instance
of worship. I know of no religion that incorporates the Pledge into
244 Id. at 225-26 (footnote omitted).
245 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 20 (statement of Solicitor Gen. Olson).
246 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, CJ., concur-
ring).
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its canon, nor one that would count the Pledge as a meaningful ex-
pression of religious faith. 24 v
The nineteen scholars of religion who filed an amicus curiae brief
disagreed with Olson, Rehnquist, and O'Connor about the impor-
tance of the fact that "under God" is not a prayer:
As scholars from divergent religious traditions, amici submit that the in-
vocation of God's name, in any setting, is a religious exercise and act. In
the classroom setting, recitation of the words "under God" in the Pledge
constitutes a religious act that is closely akin to formal prayer, and identi-
cal in purpose. The relevant question is not the form of address to God,
but the reverent and solemn manner in which God's name is invoked. 48
The clergy brief made the same point: "None of the dicta tenta-
tively or casually approving the religious portion of the Pledge of Al-
legiance considered or even noticed the fact that the Pledge is
unique in requesting a religious affirmation from individual citi-
zens."2 49 The brief further denied "that leading students in recital of a
creed is any more defensible than leading them in prayer.,
2
5
0
VI. SEGUE INTO THE PRESENT
Following Engel and Schempp, hundreds of proposals for constitu-
tional amendments were introduced into both Houses of Congress in
an effort to supersede the Supreme Court's rulings and return state-
sponsored prayer to the public schools.2'1 Only four such proposals
have come to a vote, the earliest in 1966 and the most recent in
1998. All of them received a simple majority, but none garnered
253
the required two-thirds vote. The problem, from the perspective of
amendment supporters, may be stated in the classic line from the
comic strip Pogo: "We have met the enemy, and he is us."' 54 Despite
247 Id. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
248 Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 19.
249 Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 24.
250 Id. at 25.
251 See ALLEY, supra note 20, at 111-17 (discussing the "rush by members of Con-
gress... proposing constitutional amendments to override the Court's decision" in Engel);
DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 106-43 (discussing proposed constitutional amendments regard-
ing school prayer); FENWICK, supra note 20, at 133-36 (discussing the "nearly one hundred fifty
[amendments] proposed" following the Engel and Schempp decisions); FRASER, supra note 20, at
147-50 (describing the public opposition to the Court's rulings); LAUBACH, supra note 20, at
47-97 (discussing a constitutional amendment proposed by Rep. Frank Becker).
252 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 135, 142-43, 198, 298 (discussing amendment proposals
entertained in Congress).
253 Id.
254 WALT KELLY, "WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US" (poster) (1970), available at
http://www.igopogo.com/WehavemetOl.jpg. This phrase, originally an anti-littering slogan for
Earth Day, 1970, was later incorporated into a book title. WALT KELLY, POGO: WE HAVE MET
THE ENEMYAND HE IS US (1972).
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the undeniable popularity of school prayer in the abstract, no specific
proposal has ever had sufficiently broad appeal to pass.
Not surprisingly, two major sticking points concern sectarianism
and opt-out policies-issues that have been in contention for genera-
tions. 2 Some proponents of state-sponsored school prayer, particu-
larly those who focus on states' rights, want no restrictions of any kind
on the authority of states to establish their own policies about school
prayer, including the ability to decide what prayer should be said and
whether it should be mandatory. 56 Other school-prayer supporters
oppose sectarian or nonvoluntary prayer; many members of the
clergy, in particular, have spoken out against government coercion in
matters of religion.57 Indeed, some clergy groups, notably the Na-
tional Council of Churches of Christ and the BaptistJoint Committee
on Public Affairs, have gone so far as to oppose a return to state-
sponsored school prayer on any terms.58 Like Samuel Thayer Spear
in the nineteenth century259 and the thirty-two members of the clergy
and nineteen religious scholars in Newdow,26 they take the position
that, although the government would be unlikely to endorse beliefs
incompatible with their own, its promotion of any religious view is ob-
jectionable.
An early example of this clerical stance may be found in testimony
offered to the House Judiciary Committee in 1964.261 Speaking on
behalf of the National Council of Churches, Edwin Tuller, general
255 DELFATrORE supra note 3, at 107-08.
2 Id.
257 Id.
258 The National Council of Churches of Christ has "urge[d] parents and others to refrain
from the temptation to use public schools to advance the cause of any one religion or ethnic
tradition, whether through curriculum or through efforts to attach religious personnel to the
public schools." NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A., THE
CHURCHES AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1999),
http://www.ncccusa.org/about/edpol.html. Representatives of the BaptistJoint Committee for
Religious Liberty and the Interfaith Alliance make a similar argument:
The goal of our nation's public schools is education, not indoctrination. We serve our
children best when we help to shape character in a way that appreciates an increasingly
diverse society, not when we treat them as a captive audience convened for the transmis-
sion of one particular set of religious beliefs. We wholeheartedly agree that public
schools should accommodate the religious rights of students. But, as the administra-
tion's own guidelines for educators indicate, that accommodation must be made without
disrupting the learning process or interfering with the rights of others.
J. Brent Walker & C. Welton Gaddy, Top School Officials Should Affirm Rights of Students of All
Faiths, Apr. 16, 2003, http:// www.bjcpa.org/resources/articles/2003/030416-walker-schools.
htm.
29 SPEAR, supra note 170, at 107-10.
260 Brief of Religious Scholars, supra note 43, at 6; Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 1-2.
M' School Prayers: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciay, 88th Cong. (1964) [hereinafter
School Prayers].
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secretary of the American Baptist Convention, outlined the dangers
of government-sponsored prayer:
Another very real danger is the possibility that in time this amendment
could bring about a kind of "state religion" in which forms of religious
observance and patriotism could become confused .... The act of wor-
ship might become part of being an American or being patriotic and in
time the ideas of God and the Nation can fuse into one. There would be
a real danger, then, that religion could become the tool of the state and
eventually be used for the state's purposes as has already happened in the
history of many countries.
2 62
Tuller's remarks pertained to the use of prayer as part of the offi-
cial public-school program, but the underlying sentiment is also ap-
plicable to the use of a Pledge that describes the nation to which one
is professing loyalty as being "under God." As the thirty-two members
of the clergy observed in their amicus brief,
[u] nlike any previous case in this Court, the Pledge explicitly links reli-
gious faith to political loyalty and thus to standing in the political com-
munity. A student cannot affirm her allegiance to the nation unless she
can also affirm the religious message that this nation is "under God."
Government requests simultaneous affirmation of both the patriotic and
religious professions of faith. The message of exclusion is unmistakable.
What kind of citizens can they be if they cannot even recite in good faith
the full pledge of allegiance to the nation?1
63
Throughout the debate over state-sponsored religious expression
in public schools, opposition by moderate-to-liberal clerics has been a
major source of frustration to advocates of those practices. 4 As they
point out, the majority of Americans want the government to ac-
knowledge the existence of God. Representative George Goodling, a
Republican from Pennsylvania, wrote to the National Council of
Churches in 1964 expressing his exasperation at the situation:
Frankly, I am somewhat annoyed and greatly concerned about the pre-
sent-day philosophy of some of our so-called religious leaders.... Let me
suggest you come from your exalted position and mingle with the 40 mil-
lion rank and file as I do constantly. You will discover beyond any
shadow of doubt the chiefs and indians [sic] are in violent disagree-
265
ment.
Two years later, Senator Everett Dirksen, a Republican from Illinois,
advocating a return to state-sponsored school prayer in the name of
what he called "the common man," referred to the clergy who op-
posed the majority will as "the social engineers, the panacea hunters,
262 Id. at 660 (statement of Edwin Tuller, Gen. Secretary, American Baptist Convention).
263 Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 11.
264 See DELFATrORE, supra note 3, at 122-25, 133-34 (explaining the views of some moderate
and liberal clerics who oppose state-sponsored prayer).
265 School Prayers, supra note 261, at 520.
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the world savers, and the brittle professors," and claimed that they
consisted of "a few ivory-towered leaders here who have lost contact
with the people of this country., 26 6 Indeed, the sponsors of all four
school-prayer constitutional amendments that have come up for a
vote in Congress have treated the assertion that the majority favors
school prayer as if it were an unanswerable argument.267  Most re-
cently, Representative Ernest Istook (R-Oklahoma) deliberately took
a back seat to religious advocacy groups to underscore his commit-
ment to carrying out the wishes of his constituents and supporters.
His own press release concerning his introduction of the legislation
that bore his name was headed, "Groups Announce Religious Free-
dom Amendment.
'2
6
It is, of course, not surprising that political debates about govern-
ment religious speech, far more than court decisions, focus on what
the majority wants. Representative Gillespie "Sonny" Montgomery, a
Democrat from Mississippi, candidly acknowledged this reality on the
floor of the House:
Most Americans are not interested in the arguments about whether
or not the prayer amendment will change the Bill of Rights or weaken
the Constitution. What the American people are interested in is that the
2 112 CONG. REc. 17, 23532 (1966); see also School Prayer: Hearings on S.J. Res. 148 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 13 (1966)
(statement of Sen. Dirksen) (observing that the committee was hearing "every sophisticated
argument except an argument from the common man of this country").
67 Representative Chalmers Wylie, a Republican from Ohio, similarly relied on public opin-
ion:
I am nonetheless happy at this time to be able to inform my colleagues that a poll taken
by the National Enquirer ... shows that 92.6 percent of those responding in a 2-week pe-
riod are in favor of prayer in schools and of a constitutional amendment to guarantee
that as a right.
This, Mr. Speaker, is no piddling poll....
I am greatly impressed with the heavy margin favoring the school prayer amend-
ment. I hope that my colleagues will-as representatives of all the people and not just
special interest groups-be impressed also.
117 CONG. REc. 30, 38719 (1971) (statement of Rep. Wylie). Eleven years later, Senator Strom
Thurmond expressed the same sentiment:
Now, public opinion favors voluntary prayer. The American people are openly and over-
whelmingly in favor of allowing prayer in our public schools. Several polls taken recently
by leading pollsters in America indicated the following results: 80 percent of those
polled approved of allowing prayer in public schools; 73 percent agreed that the Su-
preme Court and Congress have gone too far in keeping religious and moral values like
prayer out of our laws, our schools, and our lives; and 71 percent favored a constitutional
amendment to allow daily prayers to be recited in school classrooms.
There are few issues in my many years in the Senate which have commanded such strong
and clear support by the American people. I believe that we in Congress, therefore, have
a responsibility to address this very important matter.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Permit Voluntary Prayer: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 97th Cong. 2 (1982) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
Press Release, Representative Ernest Istook, Groups Announce Religious Freedom
Amendment (Mar. 24, 1997) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court has restricted prayer in public schools and they do not
like it one bit. If the people want voluntary prayer in the public schools
and we represent the people, then I think we should approve this resolu-
tion.
Let us lay our cards on the table. A vote for the proposed constitu-
tional amendment is going to be a lot easier to explain back home than a
vote against it. I know that if I vote against the resolution today, my op-
ponent next year will make me do a lot of explaining.21
9
On a more philosophical level, the question of state-sponsored re-
ligious speech implicates two of the most basic American principles:
majority rule and individual rights. According to the model of tolera-
tion, there is no conflict between these principles as long as minori-
ties are not forced by the government to participate in any particular
form of religious expression. 7 ° Indeed, if minorities succeeded in
thwarting the majority's desire to have the government express a be-
lief in God, that would be seen as violating the religious freedom of
the majority. But to those who adopt the model of equality, the indi-
vidual right to freedom of conscience is compromised whenever the
government puts the weight of its influence behind any religious
view, and the number of individuals who wish it to do so is irrele-
vant.27' In this model, religious belief is solely a matter of individual
rights and may not even be influenced, let alone coerced, by the gov-
ernment. Attorney Henry Sawyer, representing the Schempps, ad-
dressed this point in his oral argument before the Supreme Court:
The question is: Is it a constitutional right, under the free exercise
clause, to have the state conduct the prayer, or "to pray," in other words,
under the aegis of the state? And I think clearly not. Even if the over-
whelming majority so feel, I think it probably has nothing to do with the
271question of majorities.
Decades later, Douglas Laycock elaborated on this point:
On religious matters, citizens do not vote and government does not
lead.... Government statements on religion seem harmless only when a
vote seems unnecessary because the statement is bland enough to have
overwhelming support. But government has no more legitimate power
to lead religious oinion on the basis of an implicit vote than on the basis
of an explicit vote.
209 117 CONG. REc. 30, 39890 (1971) (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
270 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
271 DELFATrTORE, supra note 3, at 308-14.
272 Id. at 309.
273 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 241, at 29.
274 Laycock, supra note 43, at 230.
Aug. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTFFIUTIONAL LA W
VII. LIFE OUTSIDE THE Box
By the 1980s, when a generation of Americans had grown up with-
out having experienced traditional state-sponsored school prayer,
proponents of religious expression in the public schools found it eas-
ier to think in terms of new approaches as opposed to focusing on
the reinstatement of school prayer as it had existed before 1963 .
The most widely accepted of these new models was based on the
premise that students as individuals may engage in religious speech
during noninstructional time, but the state must neither encourage• *• 276
nor inhibit such activities. A limited application of this principle is
embodied in the Equal Access Act of 1984,277 which forbids federally
funded secondary schools that have even one noncurricular club
from rejecting any proposed student-initiated group "on the basis of
the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech
at such meetings.
278
The original aim of the Equal Access Act was to make it possible
for students to start Bible clubs and prayer groups, and for the first
few years after its passage it was used largely for that purpose. It was
declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v.
Mergens ex rel. Mergens, which also rejected an attempt by school offi-
cials to define noncurricular narrowly enough to permit a chess club
or a scuba-diving group to meet without triggering the requirement
that religious clubs must also be permitted. Similarly, in Hsu ex rel.
Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District, a student religious group won
the right to remain an official school club while restricting some of its
leadership positions to Christians.8 ° More recently, the Equal Access
Act has been used to protect the right of secondary-school students to
form controversial nonreligious clubs, primarily dealing with homo-
sexuality and atheism.28'
Although the Equal Access Act affects only public secondary
schools and then only under certain stated conditions, the underlying
distinction between government and private action applies more
275 See DELFAT-rORE, supra note 3, at 178-228 (discussing the causes of emerging ideas about
school prayer).
276 Id.
277 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000).
278 Id. § 4071.
279 496 U.S. 226, 239-40 (1990).
280 85 F.3d 839, 848 (2d Cir. 1996).
281 See E. High Sch. PRISM Club v. Siedel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Utah 2000) (ordering a
high school to admit the PRISM Club, which served to raise awareness of gay and lesbian con-
tributions to history and culture, because it was likely curriculum related and hence protected
alongside other clubs by the Equal Access Act); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ.,
81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that a high school did not violate the Equal Access
Act by excluding the Gay/Straight Alliance since, unlike permitted clubs, it was noncurricular).
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broadly. Unlike public-school employees, students are not agents of
the state. Their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
religion are not coextensive with those of adults, but they retain some
rights within the public schools.82 The precise definition of those
rights remains a thorny question, as does the line of demarcation be-
tween the actions of students and those of teachers and administra-
tors. In C.H. v. Oliva, for instance, the parents of a first grader chal-
lenged his teacher's decision not to allow him to read a children's
Bible aloud to the class when she had permitted other children thus
to share books they had brought from home.283 Bringing in the Bible
was the act of the child as an individual, but the teacher was called
upon to give him permission to read it to the class. This raised the
issue of school involvement with religious speech in two ways: the
other children would be compelled by the teacher to sit quietly and
listen to the Bible reading, and children as young as first graders
might not distinguish between merely allowing the Bible to be read
and signifying approval of its message.' The district court ruled in
favor of the school,8 5 and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing
the case en banc, tied.28 6 As this outcome suggests, there is significant
uncertainty about how-or whether-the distinction between gov-
ernment and private action should be operationalized in the schools,
although it enjoys wider acceptance than any other current method
of dealing with religion in public education.
The second major approach to religious expression in today's
public schools involves proposals to post generically monotheistic ma-
terials associated with American history and heritage: examples in-
clude the Ten Commandments 287 "In God We Trust, '28 8 "God Bless
America,"28 9 and "One Nation under God. 2 90 If the posting of such
items by public-school officials were declared legal, it would unques-
282 See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (upholding the
Equal Access Act in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge); Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that teachers in a Des Moines school
could not keep students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War); Hsu ex rel.
Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 873 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing, in limited cir-
cumstances, a student-run club to discriminate based on religious affiliation).
283 226 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
284 Id. at 204.
285 C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 353-54 (D.NJ. 1997), affd, 166 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1998),
affd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
286Oliva, 226 F.3d at 200.
287 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (challenging a Texas monument
to the Ten Commandments); McCreary County v. ACLU 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005) (chal-
lenging the posting of copies of the Ten Commandments in the courthouses of two Kentucky
counties).
2s8 See DELFATToRE supra note 3, at 301.
289 See id.
290 See id.
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tionably involve a degree of government endorsement that is not pre-
sent in applications of the equal-access principle, under which school
officials do not engage in their own religious speech but merely ac-
commodate that of students. For this reason, such postings are fa-
vored by people who believe that an official, national acknowledg-
ment of faith in God is necessary in order to recognize this country's
heritage and protect its liberties and security.29 The student-initiated
religious speech permitted under the equal-access model is insuffi-
cient to satisfy this purpose for exactly the reason that led the Su-
preme Court to declare it constitutional: it reflects the personal views
of individual students, not a statement of an American religious norm
or a declaration of the government's dedication to it. Conversely, the
display of religious sayings in the schools would not, in and of itself,
represent the same level of commitment by the students that equal
access does. Under equal access, students willingly engage in the re-
ligious speech of their choice, sectarian or otherwise. In most
schools, anything posted by employees would probably be very ge-
neric, and students would be likely to act as passive readers of speech
that is not their own and that does not necessarily reflect their
292views.
Like "under God" in the Pledge, displays of the Ten Command-
ments and of traditional religious mottos are often described as rep-
resenting "religion in general," as if they encompassed the universe
of religious beliefs.293 Advocates of posting such material in the pub-
lic schools either claim that it covers all religions or, as nineteenth-
century decisions do with respect to Christianity and as Justice
O'Connor does in her Newdow concurrence, they acknowledge the
existence of conflicting faiths but treat them as irrelevant to deter-
mining whether a government action favors or disfavors any particu-
lar religious belief. Moreover, even in defining monotheism itself,
there is a tendency to presume that it refers to the notion of God
most prevalent in the United States. For this reason, it is not un-
common to see the term Judeo-Christianity used as if it were inter-
changeable with monotheism.295 But even if it were true that Jewish and
Christian teachings constitute the totality of conceptualizations of a
29 See id. at 300-01 (discussing Rep. DeLay's ideas about posting religious messages in
schools to discourage tragedies like Columbine).
292 See generally id. at 299-314 (describing the current state of the controversy over religion in
the classroom).
293 See id.
294 Id.
25 See ALLEY, supra note 20, at 137 ("Jews do not have a Christian heritage, while Christians
more certainly do have a Jewish heritage.... [The term Judeo-Christian] is an effort at tolerance
that is flawed by an inherent imbalance."); DELFATTORE, supra note 3, at 311-12 (discussing the
problems with the term Judeo-Christianity).
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single deity, the notion that they form a composite religious tradition
makes sense only from a Christian-centered viewpoint. When one re-
ligion stands or falls on its belief that Jesus is God, and the other de-
nies his divinity, it is ludicrous to describe that as a single faith. What
the term Judeo-Christianity really means is that Christianity has Judaic
roots, so thatJudaism functions as the source faith and Christianity as
the successor faith. This is not the same as treating the two faiths
equally or amalgamating them into a new whole, and even as an his-
torical continuum it ends with Christianity only because the Christian
majority believes that it does. Just as Christianity arose out of Juda-
ism, Islam has its roots in both faiths, but we do not hear about a
Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition in which a religion other than
Christianity is the end point of the evolutionary process. On the con-
trary, the term Judeo-Christianity is not merely historically descriptive
but theologically argumentative, implying that Christianity is the ul-
timate successor faith, unsucceeded and unparalleled by any other
and subject to no further evolution.
This point is addressed in the clergy brief in Newdow, which sug-
gests that, although God could refer to any deity,
most students will understand their government to be asking them to
pledge allegiance to one nation under the God of the Christians. Many
students probably assume that at least this is also the God of the Jews, but
this equivalence works only from a Christian perspective. From a Jewish
perspective, the Triune God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is quite dif-, . 296
ferent from the Old Testament's more unified conception of God.
Monotheism, as it is represented in "under God" and in proposals to
post religious sayings in the public schools, appears to be a far more
generic concept of religion than the pan-Protestantism of earlier pe-
riods, and in most respects it is. Nevertheless, the comparisons be-
tween Engel and Schempp discussed in Part V, together with the confla-
tion of monotheism with Judeo-Christianity, suggest that for practical
purposes the distinction between pan-Protestantism and monotheism
may be partially semantic rather than entirely substantive.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Throughout past and present, there runs a common thread: not
the specific content of whatever is alleged to be the (all but) universal
faith, but the notion that the government may constitutionally and
justly promote whatever that faith is deemed to be at a given time.
Consider this observation by Justice Joseph Story, appointed to the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1811:
296 Brief of Clergy, supra note 43, at 6.
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Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the
[first] amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the
private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. An
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapproba-
tion, if not universal indignation.
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much
less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to pre-
vent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should Oive to an hi-
erarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.
By today's standards, Story's claim that treating all faiths equally
under the law would prostrate Christianity, knock it flat from what he
conceives to be the privileged position it deserves, would make many
people squirm. Yet the vast majority of Americans see no inconsis-
tency in placing monotheism on the same exalted plane. As an ex-
ample, Justice O'Connor's privileging of monotheism over polytheis-
tic and nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, might
cause some discomfort to advocates of governmental neutrality to all
faiths. Nevertheless as Newdow pointed out, there is significantly less
support for promoting governmental neutrality between belief and
disbelief.29s Laycock addresses this problem:
Once we get past the polite lie and agree that "under God" is reli-
gious, it is common to assume that "under God" is so generic that it in-
cludes all believers, and that only atheists and agnostics could dissent.
The legal relevance of this assumption is unclear; atheists and agnostics
have as much right as anyone else to invoke the Establishment Clause.
But the assumption matters politically ....
Although it is now widely acknowledged that Christianity is one
faith among many in terms of equality under the law, there remains a
crucial political difference between leveling the playing field for all
belief systems and placing faith itself on the same plane as atheism.
But that distinction is viable only from the viewpoint of believers, just
as similar claims with respect to the primacy of pan-Protestantism or
Judeo-Christianity make sense only from inside, not from outside, the
relevant belief system. The debate over government's role in promot-
ing majority religious beliefs is not one of absolutes, and it never has
been; it is one of perspective.
297 STORY, supra note 168, at §§ 1868,1871.
29 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Michael Newdow).
299 Laycock, supra note 43, at 226.
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Despite the inconclusive outcome of Newdow, the case represents a
milestone in the evolution of thought about religion in the public
schools because its focus on generic monotheism renders obsolete
the model used to resolve earlier disputes. In the past, protests over
school prayer led to shifts in scope from specific Protestant denomi-
nations to pan-Protestantism to Judeo-Christianity/monotheism, all
of which was possible within the bounds of terrestrial logic. Beyond
that, however, lies intellectual chaos. A formulation addressing
"whatever god or gods there may be, if any, and if indeed you take
any role in earthly affairs, or possibly not" is clearly insufficient to ful-
fill the alleged secular purposes of government-sponsored references
to religion, such as solemnizing occasions and recognizing the na-
tion's religious heritage. We are rapidly approaching the point at
which we will have to stop broadening the question and simply face it:
is it in fact appropriate for the government to use religious means to
achieve secular purposes, to explain its political philosophy, or to de-
termine its public policies? The statements by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and Thomas, and Solicitor General Ol-
son, together with the work of legal scholars Thomas Berg and Emily
Newhouse, assert that the answer is yes. Michael Newdow's state-
ments, the Ninth Circuit decision, the briefs of the thirty-two mem-
bers of the clergy and the nineteen religious scholars, and the article
by Douglas Laycock take the opposite stand, as does the present Arti-
cle.
It is a contradiction in terms to say that the government must pro-
claim as fact the most fundamental tenet of the majority's religious
faith in order to explain a political philosophy based on respect for
the individual. Government is quintessentially collective, whereas be-
liefs about the so-called big questions, such as the existence of God
and the nature of our relationship to him, are inherently individual.
The claim that individual liberty is served when the government as-
serts that that liberty arises from, and depends upon, the objective
truth of the majority religious tradition is not an absolute; it makes
sense only from the perspective of people who accept that tradition.
To those whose line of vision originates outside the circle of that be-
lief, the naked majoritarianism of "under God" has nothing to do
with the individual rights of nonbelievers or of people who believe in
God but not in professions of religious faith by the government. To
be sure, many issues require majority decisions by the electorate or by
its representatives. The principle of majority rule rightly applies,
however, only when a decision must be made on behalf of the com-
munity-whether taxes will be raised, for instance, or where a new
landfill will be located. The government is not called upon to decide
whether God exists, nor is it justified in linking the official pledge of
loyalty to this nation with the ratification of majoritarian theology in
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the name of individual rights that apparently do not extend fully to
those individuals who are distinct from the majority.
There is no doubt that majorities and minorities alike have the
right to practice and promote their religious views in public, and the
more numerous the adherents of a particular belief system, the more
impact their collective expressions of faith will have on the commu-
nity and, cumulatively, on the nation. All this is entirely in keeping
with a free society, and arguing that the government should not put a
thumb on the scale in matters of religion does not mean that religion
should be taken out of the public sphere. Religion is a private matter
as opposed to a governmental one, not as opposed to a public one;
and although the majority's votes give it the power to blur the line
between the two, it has no right to do so.
A particularly apt expression of this distinction between public
and governmental displays of the will of the majority may be found in
the oral argument in School District v. Schempp, when Justice Potter
Stewart asked Henry Sawyer, the attorney for the Schempp family,
"But isn't it a gross interference with the free exercise of their relig-
ion, of those, in my imaginary case-those 98 percent of the student
body who say our religious beliefs tell us that [public group prayer] is
what we want to do?"3 0  Sawyer's reply was direct, pithy, and abso-
lutely on target. "Well, they have a right to do it, Your Honor," he
said, "but they haven't got a right to get the state to help them."30' Al-
though Protestant practices were at issue in that particular case, Saw-
yer's underlying point pertains to any manifestation of the majority's
desire to have its world view pronounced valid by the government. As
this Article suggests, there is no principled distinction between gov-
ernment promotion of Protestantism or of monotheism. The former
would not be feasible in most of the country today because the popu-
lation is more heterogeneous than it was in the nineteenth century,
and monotheism now serves as the religious tradition that almost all
Americans embrace as objectively true. But the game is the same; all
that has changed is the size of the ball.
M0 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 241, at 30 (statement of the Court).
301 Id. (statement of Mr. Sawyer).
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